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Max Weber and Jirgen Habermas:
The Sociology and Philosophy of Law
During Crises of the State
John P. McCormick*
INTRODUCTION
The English-speaking intellectual world has eagerly awaited the
translation of Faktizitit und Geltung, JUrgen Habermas's magnum
opus of legal and state theory, since its German publication in 1992.1
Anticipation has run particularly high with respect to Habermas's
attempts to (1) definitively mediate his influential system-lifeworld
thesis of modernity through the institution of law;2 (2) translate his
social-philosophical theory of communicative ethics into the terms of
political and legal theory;3 and, perhaps most ambitiously, (3)
overcome the opposition between purely empirical and strictly
normative approaches to modern societies, particularly the treatment
of law in such analyses.4
* Visiting Scholar, Center for European Studies, New York University, 1996-97; Assistant
Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshire. This Article originated in two
sources: Richard Posner's and Stephen Holmes's winter 1993 seminar on Weber's sociology of
law at the University of Chicago Law School and countless conversations and correspondence
with Neil Brenner on Habermas's social and political theory. For helpful discussions, comments,
and criticisms pertaining to this Article I thank the above, as well as the following: audiences
at the Center for European Law and Politics, University of Bremen; the Departments of Law
and Social/Political Science, European University Institute, Florence; the Government
Department, Wesleyan University; the Department of Political Science, Western Michigan
University; and a panel at the 1996 American Political Science Association annual meeting, San
Francisco.
1. Jurgen Habermas, Faktizitat und Geltung: Beitrage zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des
demokratischen Rechtsstaats [Facticity and Validity: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992). I cite the English edition, Between Facts
and Norms, translated by William Rehg and published by MIT Press in 1996.
2. The system-lifeworld distinction was elaborated in Jilrgen Habermas, Theory of
Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984-87).
3. See Jtlrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) and Justification and Ap-
plication: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
4. These themes have been explored in several Anglo-American reviews of the work: see
David Dyzenhaus, "The Legitimacy of Legality," University of Toronto Law Journal 46 (1996);
1
McCormick: The Sociology and Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 9: 297
I will argue here that in order fully to understand Habermas's
theoretical efforts in Between Facts and Norms one must take into
account the legal-sociological framework that he inherits from Max
Weber.5 This is by no means a purely intellectual or cultural in-
heritance, for Weber's sociology of law played a crucial role in the
historical drama that was the collapse of Germany's first effort at
liberal and social democracy: the Weimar Republic. It is the ghost of
this failure that has haunted virtually all of Habermas's theoretical
endeavors, no less Between Facts and Norms-perhaps even especially
therein because of the centrality of law to its framework.
I claim that Habermas's textual and often subtextual desire to
address those legal-theoretical problems that confronted Weber in a
particular crisis of the state at the dawn of this century significantly
undermines his attempt to address contemporary socio-political
concerns. There exists a qualitatively different crisis of the state, and
the role of law within it, at the twilight of the twentieth century than
that in effect in Weber's time. The legal crisis with which Weber dealt
was influenced in large part by the transition from a nineteenth-
century noninterventionist-state model to a twentieth-century welfare-
state one,6 and the present predicament of law and the state is
increasingly generated by transnational phenomena associated with
growing interdependence of nation states.7 Moreover, the intellectual
categories on which Habermas relies in answering the deficiencies of
Weber's earlier approach merge uniformly with Weber's own Kantian
Cass R. Sunstein, "Democracy Isn't What You Think," New York Times Book Review, 18
August 1996; Michel Rosenfeld, "Law as Discourse: Between Democracy and Rights," Harvard
Law Review 108 (1995); James Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism and the Constitutional State,"
Law and Society Review 28 (1994); David Rasmussen, "How is Valid Law Possible?" Philosophy
& Social Criticism 20 (1994); Peter Dews, "Agreeing What's Right," London Review of Books,
13 May 1993; Stephen K. White, review of Faktizittt und Geltung, by Jtorgen Habermas, Political
Theory 24 (1996); as well as William Rehg, introduction to Between Facts and Norms, by Jurgen
Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). A symposium on the work, originally presented in
1992 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, was recently published: "Habermas on Law
and Democracy: Critical Exchanges," Cardozo Law Review 17 (1996).
5. For an alternative analysis of the manner in which Habermas grapples with Weberian
categories in Between Facts and Norms, see Dyzenhaus, "The Legitimacy of Legality."
6. Two compelling accounts of the crisis of law in this transition within the German context
are William E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the
Rule of Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), and Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the
Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
7. On the present crisis of law with respect to the indeterminacy of national sovereignty, see
E. Wyatt, "New Legal Order, or Old?" European Legal Review 7 (1982); Volkmar Gessner and
Angelika Schade, "Conflicts of Culture in Cross-Border Legal Relations: the Conception of a
Research Topic in the Sociology of Law," Theory, Culture & Society 7 (1990); Volkmar Gessner,
"Global Approaches in the Sociology of Law: Problems and Challenges," Journal of Law &
Society 22 (1995); Alec Stone, "What is a Supranational Constitution?: An Essay in International
Relations Theory," Review of Politics 56 (1994); S. Howe, "Globalising the Law," International
Business Lawyer (1995); and, especially, Neil MacCormick, "Beyond the Sovereign State,"
Modern Law Review 56 (1993).
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philosophical perspective, thus completing the gradual shift from
Hegel to Kant developed in Habermas's work over the last twenty
years. This philosophical shift further impinges on Habermas's ability
to account for historical change in his social theory of law-change
that has arguably made Weber's paradigm of law and the state of
decreased significance.
In coming years, legal philosophy and the sociology of law will be
increasingly confronted with the empirical fact of diminishing state
ability to address issues of bureaucratic accountability, economic
regulation, and social justice under emerging conditions of what has
been variously referred to as internationalization, regionalization, mul-
tilateralism, Post-Fordism, and, most fashionably, globalization!
Habermas, not only as an author who attempts to combine contem-
porary philosophical and sociological analyses, but also as an heir to
a tradition-the so-called Frankfurt School of critical theory-that has
always been sensitive to the possibility of democratic advancement
within changing historical conditions, is the logical source of guidance
in the formulation of categories to address this novel world-historical
scenario. I demonstrate, however, that Habermas's fixation on the
problematic that vexed German sociology of law and legal philosophy
in the past-embodied in theoretical terms by Weber's sociology of
law, and manifested in historical terms by the constitutional crisis of
the Weimar Republic-leaves him somewhat ill-equipped to meet the
challenges of a declining, rather than maturing, welfare state,
challenges brought on by the increasingly transnational character of
capital and finance, the growing interdependence of nation states, and
the technologically accelerated interpenetration of cultures across the
globe.
Ultimately the criteria that I will employ to measure the relative
adequacy of Habermas's theoretical categories in this endeavor will
not be arbitrarily imposed on Habermas-i.e., I do not intend to show
that Habermas is in fact oblivious to empirical reality despite his
claims to the contrary. Rather, my criticisms will be derived from
Habermas's own theoretical goals and his definition of what has come
to be called "critical theory," both as he has explained it in the past
8. See Robert 0. Keohane and Helen V. Miller, eds., Internationalization and Domestic
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture:
Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1990); John Gerard
Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993); Ash Amin, ed., Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994); Suzanne Berger and Donald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996); and Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global
Culture (London: Sage, 1992).
1997] 299
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and as it is practiced in his discourse theory of constitutional
democracy.9
I. WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
The sociology of law elaborated in Weber's mammoth Economy
and Society1" in many ways sets the agenda for Habermas's legal
philosophy.1' I will focus herein upon two aspects of Weber's
multifaceted analysis of law: (A) Weber's analytical approach as it
unfolds in the work and (B) his historical approach as conveyed in
particular parts of the "Sociology of Law" section itself.2
A. Analytical Approach
Weber's analytical account of the law seeks to explain how a
sociological observer would deduce that modern law is correct or
valid. He sets out two ways of so evaluating modern law within the
analytical approach: (1) record relative compliance with the law
empirically and factually,3 and (2) analyze whether the law is
semantically constructed in a formally rational and logical manner.14
The obvious problem with (1) is that it is ultimately indifferent as to
whether compliance with the law is secured through coercion or terror
or as a result of a blind or unreflective subjective belief in the law by
9. This line of criticism has been followed rather successfully by Veit-Michael Bader, "Viel
Geltung und immer weniger Faktizitat: Zur Kritik an Juirgen Habermas' diskurstheoretischer
Rechts- und Demokratietheorie," in Hans Ganjlmann and S. Kriger, eds., Produktion-und
Klassentheorie: Festschrift fPr Sebastion Herkommer (Hamburg: USA-Verlag, 1993); Neil
Brenner, "The Limits of Civil Society in the Age of Global Capital: A Critique of Jtlrgen
Habermas's Mature Social Theory," Master's Thesis, University of Chicago, 1993; and somewhat
less successfully by Ota Weinberger, "Habermas on Democracy and Justice: Limits of a Sound
Conception," Ratio Juris 7 (1994).
10. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
11. This is explicit in Habermas's first full-scale foray into legal studies, "Law and Morality,"
in S.M. McMurrin, ed., vol. 8, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 1988), and is more implicit in Between Facts and Norms. Reliable discussions of
Habermas's legal theory prior to the publication of the latter work would include Klaus Eder,
"Critique of Habermas' Contribution to the Sociology of Law," Law and Society Review 22
(1988); Walter T. Murphy, "The Habermas Effect: Critical Theory and Academic Law," Current
Legal Problems 42 (1989); Karlo Tuori, "Discourse Ethics and the Legitimacy of the Law," Ratio
Juris 2 (1989); Wibren Van der Burg, "Jirgen Habermas on Law and Morality: Some Critical
Comments," Theory, Culture & Society 7 (1990); William E. Scheuerman, "Neumann v.
Habermas: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law," Praxis International 13 (1993); and
Mathieu Deflem, "Law in Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action," Philosophy & Social
Criticism 20 (1994).
12. Recent noteworthy treatments of Weber's sociology of law include Stephen M. Feldman,
"An Interpretation of Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage
of Constitutional Law," Law & Social Inquiry 16 (1991); Harold J. Berman, "Some False
Premises of Max Weber's Sociology of Law," Washington University Law Quarterly 65 (1987);
and David Campbell, "Truth Claims and Value-Freedom in the Treatment of Legitimacy: The
Case of Weber," Journal of Law & Society 13 (1986).
13. Weber, Economy and Society, 311.
14. Ibid., 656-57.
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the subjects to whom it is applied. t5 The problem with (2) is that
there are innumerable statements that may be formulated in a
sufficiently formal and logical manner, that conform with pre-
established procedures, and that are applied consistently, whose
particular normative status could be deemed questionable or even
plainly immoral according to commonly-held ethical standards. To
jump ahead historically, in little more than a decade after the
appearance of Weber's volume some of the best legal minds of central
Europe would set to work codifying in a discretely formal and
eloquently logical manner some of the most abhorrent laws ever to
exist in the history of Europe.16
B. Historical Approach
In the section specifically titled "Economy and Law (The Sociology
of Law),"17 Weber undertakes a more historically specific analysis of
modern law. After a discussion of what he calls the "Formal Law," a
creation that reached its pinnacle under the conditions of nineteenth-
century capitalism in Western Europe and North America, Weber
describes the contemporary emergence of what he calls "deformalized
law,"' 8 or what is referred to elsewhere as "materialized law." The
difference between the two types can be explained somewhat
reductively in the following way: In the context of laissez-faire
capitalism, where the state to some extent remains distinct from
society, the law serves as the general and supposedly neutral rules to
be abided by all the players within society; rules are set by a state that
itself acts only as an umpire. This model presupposes a Continental
version of the separation of powers, where the legislature takes
precedence over the other two branches, delegating to them specific
tasks and duties. It also presupposes a formula in which legal
sentences are promulgated in conditional, "if x, then y," statements;
that is, there is no state action without a specific condition or prior
action, and hence a particular case, to trigger it. Such laws are
addressed generally, directed to no particular social group. These
15. Weber initially attempts to separate the coercive aspect of this definition from the freely
believed-in aspect, only to collapse the two since he feels that all law is to some extent based
upon force: "The distinction between an order derived from voluntary agreement and one which
has been imposed is only relative." Ibid., 37; cf. ibid., 214.
16. See Ingo MUller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991); and Raif von Dreier and Wolfgang Sellert, eds., Recht und Justiz im
"Dritten Reich" (Frankfurt au Main: Suhrkamp, 1989); Bernd Rilthers, Entartetes Recht:
Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich (Munich: Beck, 1988); as well as the classic,
Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship, trans. E.A. Shils
(New York: Octagon Books, 1969).
17. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. II, 641. [hereinafter "The Sociology of Law"].
18. Weber, Economy and Society, 880-89.
1997]
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specifications work to keep the state from intruding arbitrarily into
society. However, the obvious flaw of this model, based upon
historical experience, is that this non- or qualified-interventionism
allows quite a significant amount of social inequality to remain
unaddressed by the state within society (e.g., wage-slavery, child labor,
unlimited work hours, etc.).
Under conditions of increasing interventionism in the twentieth
century, the state takes a more active role in both regulating the
economy and addressing issues of social injustice. Lawmaking thus
entails creation of the very rules by which the state itself plays. State
action is no longer exclusively triggered by a particular case but,
because of the broad goals that it is meant to achieve, continues in
perpetuity. Legal sentences are no longer conditional statements but
direct decrees without stopping points or specific actions within which
to frame and contain them. The separation of powers is significantly
undermined as the legislature grants the executive and judiciary wide
discretion to carry out broad social goals. Law becomes, on the one
hand, less general as it comes to be applied to specific groups
(regulating corporations and protecting associations such as organized
labor) and, on the other, less neutral as it is now enforced by one of
the participants in the game: the state itself. Weber, despite his unam-
biguous advocacy of state welfare reform elsewhere, laments-perhaps
because of his training as a lawyer19-this development as a crisis in
accountability and determinacy for the law.2"
C. Reflections on Weber's Approaches to Law
If a person stepped back and examined these analyses from a
distance he might notice that the categories that constitute the title
and soul of Habermas's work, written some seventy-five years later,
Between Facts and Norms, or more literally, Facticity and Validity,
were already present in both of Weber's approaches. The analytical
account's concern with actual compliance with the law parallels an
empirically verifiable, factual approach to law; the formal account's
concern with the logic and consistency of law-making and application
19. See Anthony T. Kronman, Jurists in Profile: Max Weber (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1983).
20. Franz Neumann's 1937 essay, "The Change in the Function of Law in Modem Society,"
in The Rule of Law Under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann & Otto Kirchheimer, ed.
William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), is perhaps the definitive
statement of this transformation of law. The most elaborate and articulate contemporary analysis
of this problematic of "deformalized" welfare-state law-drawing explicitly from Neumann's
account-is Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception. For a specific consideration of
the rule of law in the welfare state in the American context, see Cass R. Sunstein, After the
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parallels a conception of abstractly rational validity. Through the
historical approach it may be observed that the nineteenth-century
model held formal validity as a priority, while the twentieth-century
welfare state model prioritizes factual enforcement and policy
enactment. If this person were to step back even further, he might see
that the analytical account is itself abstractly formal since Weber
discusses modern law in a manner that is devoid of references to a
specific historical time and space. On the other hand, the historical
account is itself specifically directed to a concrete historical develop-
ment actually experienced by the industrial societies of his day. The
importance of the categories of facticity and validity that pervade
Weber's account was not lost on his students in the years immediately
following his death, and after the posthumous publication in 1920 of
Economy and Society.
The significance of these respective categories and their relationship
to each other reached a rather precarious point in the legal and
political debates surrounding Germany's first attempt at democracy
in the Weimar Republic, and arguably foreshadowed the Republic's
eventual collapse and the subsequent triumph of National Socialism.
In this sense, the analytical aspect of Weber's approach would be
grafted onto the historical account in Weimar's crisis of law and the
state, as juridical activists would seize upon the theoretical categories
of the former to battle over the changing historical circumstances
foreseen in the latter. As I will explain below, the efforts of Hans
Kelsen can be understood as an attempt to maintain a formal
conception of legal normativity that allows for the expansion of
democracy under welfare state conditions while, on the other hand,
the work of Carl Schmitt represents a jurisprudential attempt to
coerce the conformity of society with supposedly irresistible factually-
structural imperatives of concrete state intervention, a move that
entails authoritarian consequences. The collapse of Weimar is often
viewed as the victory of the latter hyperfactual over the former
overly-normative position, a victory all too easily facilitated by the
inherent weakness of the former and the ruthlessness of the latter, i.e.,
validity subdued by facticity.21 It is this historical and personal
memory of the failure of German democracy and the victory of the
forces of reaction that has always motivated, and still now motivates,
Habermas's endeavors-endeavors that have consistently sought to
21. See David Dyzenhaus, Truth's Revenge: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller
in Weimar (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997).
1997]
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solve theoretical dilemmas that have practical import in empirical
reality.
22
D. Socio-Legal Categories and the Weimar Crisis of the State
The ensuing crisis of the Weimar Republic can be read as a crisis
of law during the transition to the welfare state, a crisis foreshadowed
in Weber's work and, as we will see in greater detail below, one that
continues to hover over Habermas's contemporary enterprise. The
categories of facticity and validity stand out not only as unmediated
theoretical opposites in Weber's theory, but as the intellectual
standards to which his students strained as they struggled to discern
the fate of the law-and concomitantly liberal and social
democracy-in Weimar Germany.
While not officially a student of Weber, Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen
shared with Weber a neo-Kantian methodology and epistemology.
23
The left-liberal democrat Kelsen practiced the abstract and general
aspects of law described in Weber's sociology, aspects that focused
primarily on the law's abstract validity.24 He attempted to construct
a formal notion of constitutional law that would allow those progres-
sive social forces that were, for the first time, represented in Central
European parliaments to promote an agenda, which would permit the
welfare state to address effectively political and economic injustice.
A jurist who was a student of Weber's, attending both famous
"Vocation" lectures26 as well as the "Parliament and Government in
a Newly Ordered Germany" address, 21 was right-wing lawyer Carl
22. Witness, for instance, Habermas's intervention in the Historikerstreit over the place of
the Holocaust in German history: Jtargen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism
and the Historians' Debate, trans. and ed. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989). Habermas himself has intimated just how much the weight of Weimar legal theory bears
down upon postwar German jurisprudence and social theory and, by extension, his own
theoretical efforts. See Habermas, "Law and Morality," 233.
23. See Stanley L. Paulson, "The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law,"
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12 (1992) and Dhananjai Shivakumar, Note, "The Pure Theory
of Law: Defending Kelsen on the Basis of Weberian Methodology," Yale Law Journal 105
(1996). On the theoretical content and historical context of neo-Kantianism in Central Europe
during this period see Thomas Willey, Back to Kant The Revival of Kantianism in German
Social and Historical Thought, 1860-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).
24. See Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveranitat und die Theorie des Volkerrechts:
Beitrage zu einer Reinen Rechtslehre (Ttlbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1920); Der soziologische und der
juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhaltnisses von Staat und Recht (Aalen:
Scientia, 1981); and Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. Bonnie L. Paulson and
Stanley L. Paulson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
25. See Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty.
26. See Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," and "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1958).
27. Included in Weber, Economy and Society.
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Schmitt.28 Sniffing out the opportunity for state self-assertion in
Weber's historically specific account of the supercession of formal rule
of law by a deformalized welfare state law, Schmitt incessantly sought
to hasten the demise of the formal rule.29 His aspirations for an
authoritarian interventionist state that would intercede in society-not
to address socio-economic injustice but to further the aggrandizement
of the state's power vis-A-vis liberal and leftist social forces-led him
to support successive attempts at presidential coups by first Catholic,
then Prussian aristocrats over and against the democratically elected
parliament. In the wake of such arguably treasonous failures he
endorsed a triumphant National Socialism in 1933.30
Georg Lukdcs, one of Weber's closest and perhaps most singularly
brilliant students, chose not to privilege one theoretical pole of
validity or facticity over the other. Instead, in an unfortunately
understudied legal section of his History and Class Consciousness
collection of 1923, Lukdcs calls for a Hegelian mediation and
overcoming of such false-that is, independently empty and ineffec-
tual-oppositions as Kelsenian abstract validity and Schmittian
concrete factuality, categories he calls "antinomies of bourgeois
thought., 3' Lukdcs uses this phrase to demonstrate the link between
the supposedly mutually indissoluble "ideal" versus "reality" poles of
Kantian philosophy, and the methodology practiced by neo-Kantians
such as Lukdcs's mentor, Weber. This methodology is perhaps best
exemplified by Weber's sociological approach, which applies subjec-
tively constructed "ideal types" to concrete empirical reality.
3 2
Lukics, for his part, attempted to ground these poles of validity and
facticity in the respective abstract and concrete moments of both
Marx's analysis of commodity form, exchange-value, and use-value,
and the historical dynamics of capitalism. In joining the Communist
party, he sought the practical overcoming of these oppositions and the
28. See Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920, trans. Michael S.
Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and G. L. Ulmen, Politische Mehrwert:
eine Studie uber Max Weber und Carl Schmitt (Weinheim: VCH Acta Humaniora, 1991).
29. This is the sometimes stated goal of Carl Schmitt, Die Hiter der Verfassung (Tuibingen:
Mohr, 1931) and Legalitiat und Legitimitat (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1932). On Schmitt's
Weimar thought, see John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics
as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
30. On Schmitt's theoretical-political strategies, his constitutional debates with Kelsen, and
his role in the collapse of the republic, see Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception;
Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty; Dyzenhaus, Truth's Revenge; and Stanley L. Paulson, "The Reich
President and Weimar Constitutional Politics: Aspects of the Schmitt-Kelsen Dispute on the
'Guardian of the Constitution,"' (paper presented at the American Political Science Association
Annual Meeting, Chicago, 31 August-3 September 1995).
31. Georg Lukics, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1988), 95-98, 256-71.
32. See Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward A. Shils
and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949).
19971
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socio-economic reality with which they corresponded, first in the
present moment of revolution and eventually in apologies for Lenin
and Stalin.3
Despite the particularly misguided activity that resulted from
Lukics's attempted transcendance of Weber's neo-Kantian categories,
the spirit of this Hegelian-Marxist theoretical-practical project was
passed down to his progeny in the so-called Frankfurt School of
Critical Social Theory. It is to this legacy that Jirgen Habermas is
today the preeminent heir.34 And so we should not be surprised to
find in the title of Habermas's recent major theoretical effort, Between
Facts and Norms, categories familiar from Weber's "Sociology of
Law." Habermas's almost equally mammoth tome purports to mediate
the opposition between that empirical facticity [Faktizitat] and
abstract validity [Geltung] expressed in its title, and he therein
discusses contemporary expressions of each. Yet behind the norm-
dismissing, factually-fixated systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, 35 a
theory frequently criticized in the work, looms the specter of Schmitt;
behind what Habermas identifies as the empirically blind normativity
of John Rawls 36 stands Kelsen. According to Habermas, the former's
"sociological theories of law" convey a "false realism that underes-
timates the empirical impact of the normative presuppositions of
existing legal practice,"37 while the latter's "philosophical theories of
justice" are problematically formulated "in vacuo" socially-that is,
to a great extent oblivious to social reality and the politically mar-
ginalizing effects of purely abstract categories. 8 Whether Habermas
successfully mediates these poles within a contemporary crisis of the
state, or does so only in an unwittingly anachronistic manner within
the earlier Weberian and Weimar contexts of crisis, will be a crucial
question to the following discussion.
33. On Luk~cs's relationship to and critique of Weber in this regard, as well as the contrast
between Luklcs's and Schmitt's approaches to their mutual mentor, see John P. McCormick,
"Transcending Weber's Categories of Modernity?: The Early Luklcs and Schmitt on the
Rationalization Thesis," in New German Critique (forthcoming 1997).
34. On this intellectual tradition, see Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of
a Concept from Lukdcs to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). On
Habermas's relationship to the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School, its major figures, such as
Theodore W. Adorno, and the general intellectual context of the Federal Republic of Germany,
see Romand Coles, "Identity and Difference in the Ethical Positions of Adorno and Habermas";
Nancy S. Love, "What's Left of Marx?"; and Max Pensky, "Universalism and the Situated
Critic," in the "Heritage and Context" section of Stephen K. White, ed., The Cambridge
Companion to Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
35. See Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1969) and
A Sociological Theory of Law, trans. Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow (Boston: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1985).
36. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971) and Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
37. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, xl.
38. Ibid., 57.
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II. HABERMAS'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
Habermas can be understood to propose a solution to Weber's
analytical problematic if one reinterprets in terms of law his system-
lifeworld distinction,3 9 a distinction originally formulated in his two-
volume social-theoretical epic, Theory of Communicative Action.a°
A. Language, Law, and Lifeworld versus System
Habermas's theory of modernity, as set forth in Theory of Com-
municative Action, provides the basis for his efforts in Between Facts
and Norms to fill the normative deficit left by Weber's analytical
approach to law, wherein even laws imposed by force or irrationally
observed could be deemed valid, and hence potentially legitimate.
The attempt of Between Facts and Norms to inject a normative
dimension into Weberian legal sociology allows Habermas to recon-
figure the classical model of state and society presupposed by
traditional social theory. Habermas detaches the economy from the
society component of the nineteenth-century binary state/society
model and attaches it to the state, thereby forming what he calls the
system, i.e., that part of modernity concerned with the material
reproduction and administrative regulation of society, a body that
functions primarily through the language of strategic rationality. What
remains of the nineteenth-century model is society, reconstructed in
Habermas's thesis as the lifeworld, i.e., that part of modernity
comprising the family, free associations, religion, etc., which sym-
bolically reproduce culture through communicative rationality
characterized by an implicit desire to reach understanding in virtually
every utterance of communication. Not just undifferentiated
39. Ibid., 169ff., 295-302, 319-21.
40. On the relationship of Theory of Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms,
see Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rechtsstaat: Habermas' Faktizitait und Geltung," in
White, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Habermas; Dews, "Agreeing What's Right"; and
Deflem, "Law in Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action." The ensuing discussion in this
section is a necessarily brief, but hopefully not excessively crude, summary of the combined ar-
guments of the two works, as well as those of two important works-Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action and Justification and Application-written by Habermas in the years
between the publication of Theory of Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms. For
excellent discussions of Habermas's communicative ethics, see the essays by Stephen K. White,
Georgia Warnke, J. Donald Moon, Mark Warren, and Simone Chambers in White, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Habermas; David Ingram, "The Limits and Possibilities of
Communicative Ethics for Democratic Theory," Political Theory 21 (1993); The Communicative
Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990);
James Bohman, "Communication, Ideology and Democratic Theory," American Political Science
Review 84 (1990); Jean Cohen, "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society," Philosophy & Social
Criticism 14 (1988); Seyla Benhabib, "The Utopian Dimension in Communitarian Ethics," New
German Critique 85 (1985); and Agnes Heller, "The Discourse Ethics of Habermas: Critique and
Appraisal," Thesis Eleven: Rethinking Social and Political Theory 10-11 (1984-85).
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sociological entities in this theory, the lifeworld and its heterogeneous
character are emphasized through an elaboration of the com-
municative activity that constitutes it; that is, through the institutions
of civil society, public spheres, and weak and strong publics. These
informal institutions are the loci that generate what he terms
communicative power.41 The lifeworld is economically dependent on
the system to produce the material requisites of life, and politically
dependent on it to enforce the communicatively-derived decisions
made through civil society, public spheres, and discursive publics.
However the lifeworld is potentially threatened by the social inequali-
ties generated by the economy and the potentially arbitrary ad-
ministrative activities performed by the bureaucratic state apparatus,
pathologies of modern life identified by Habermas as the
"colonization of the lifeworld."42
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas characterizes law as the
mediator between the lifeworld and the system, the "transformer"
that converts the communicative language of the lifeworld into the
strategic language of the administrative state and the economy.4 3 He
purports to overcome the Weberian dilemma of formal procedures of
lawmaking and factual instances of compliance that have. no inherent
normative content by re-thinking will-formation in terms of his
discourse theory of society. In so doing, Habermas claims to evade the
problems of both liberal and republican models: The former engender
a legitimation deficit in the conception of pre-formed and somewhat
rigidly understood interests that either prevail, fail, or are
compromised in the law-making process, thereby necessarily creating
political losers; the latter constrain the possibilities of democracy by
placing limits on what is open for discussion in their particular
deliberative political models, for instance the topic of the status of the
41. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 151-57.
42. On the advantages and limits of the system-lifeworld distinction, see the friendly but
serious remarks of the following: Fred R. Dallmayr, "Habermas and Rationality," Political
Theory 16 (1988); Axel Honneth, The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social
Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); and Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical
Theory?: The Case of Habermas and Gender," in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). For
a Habermasian interpretation of civil society, see Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society
and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). Habermas's own conception of the public
sphere was set forth in his first book, the 1962 work The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1989). For recent reevaluations of this thesis, see the essays collected in the volume,
Habermas and the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society, ed. Craig
Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), especially the contribution by Nancy Fraser,
"Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,"
in which is formulated the distinction between "weak" and "strong" publics that Habermas ap-
propriates, and partially subverts, in Between Facts and Norms.
43. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 56, 169.
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republican polity itself.' Habermas outflanks both models by
seeking to gain the assent of all communicative actors affected by a
particular law or policy. Habermas thereby conceptualizes law in a
way that renders its functioning both normatively rich and substan-
tively rational. He avoids the coercive shadow of a law enforced upon
those who have not consented to it by guaranteeing that the collective
and potentially unanimous will of a populace (or a particular part
thereof) affected by a law is reflected in the making and enforcement
of that law, through his establishment of a communicative process free
of coercion and capable of facilitating the transformation of interests
and positions. By building into the process of law-making institutional
opportunities for understanding, and therefore for the emergence of
the best justifications for policy decisions and by fostering non-
exclusively strategic bargains, Habermas ensures that law will not be
accepted by its authors/subjects as mere convention."
In the next section I discuss just how Habermas understands law
simultaneously to protect the lifeworld from the pathological excesses
of the economically/bureaucratically functioning system and, conver-
sely, to insure that the latter performs only as the rational instrument
of the former. Moreover Habermas undertakes this task without
lapsing into either holistic and thereby potentially authoritarian
notions of a quasi-homogenous democratic people, or excessively
formalistic accounts of those relationships of legal actors and subjects
that result in weak and vulnerable models of constitutional
democracy. First, to conclude this section, I offer a brief clarification
and defense of Habermas's discourse theory of law.
In assessing the merits of Between Facts and Norms, many critics
appear to misapprehend the linguistic underpinnings of discourse
theory when they suggest that Habermas arbitrarily insists on
potentially unanimous consensus building in law and constitution
making. One articulate, though herein misguided, commentator states
that, "the insistence on rational argumentation seems to be dictated
more by the preferences of the discourse theorists than by any
presupposed rules of language."' This common type of objection
ignores Habermas's central arguments concerning the mutual
understanding necessarily taken for granted in every act of speech.
Even the most hostile or aggressive verbal directive assumes certain
abilities of reception on the part of the addressee. When confronted
44. On the liberal versus republican debate in constitutional law, see Cass R. Sunstein,
"Preferences and Politics," Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991); and Sunstein, "Beyond the
Republican Revival," Yale Law Journal 97 (1988).
45. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 180.
46. James Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 55.
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with such assumptions the aggressive addressor can either rationally
accept the egalitarian notions presupposed in his speech act or
concede that he is committing an irrational act, in which case he
removes himself from the realm of rationally productive discourse.
This invites a moment of challenge to authority. The historical
examples of oppression to which critics often gesture as proof of the
inefficacy of emancipatory discourse are rife with precisely the kinds
of restrictions on free speech that Habermas suggests are performative
self-negations on the part of those who wield power. Indeed, the
example from Plato's Republic of Thrasymachus and the blush that
Socrates induces in him reveals that power, no matter how cynically
asserted, must be communicatively legitimated with those over whom
it is exercised. This can, but need not necessarily, initiate a cycle of
less legally restricted communication, which leads to further progres-
sive political practice, which itself leads to more substantive forms of
communication, and so on. In this historical possibility lies the source
of discourse theory's subversive and emancipatory potential.
The "playing games" hypothetical to which critics often resort, an
example that purportedly exposes the trivially tautological character
of discourse theory, is also easily addressed. The point is not, as many
suggest, that advocating discourse theory in law and politics is
equivalent to "telling someone that if he or she wants to play tennis,
the rules of tennis must be followed,"47 but rather that if two or
more persons want to play tennis correctly and fairly, certain strictures
apply. To play without a net is, according to communicatively
established convention, not to play tennis properly. Moreover, to play
with the hand of one of the participants tied behind his back is to play
inequitably. Most importantly, according to Habermas, the rules of
law and politics are (factually) and should be (normatively) open-
ended and subject to the constant and perpetual discussion,
evaluation, and transformation of the rules of social life. This can
never be done unilaterally or "monologically," in the style of Rawls's
original position, for that would entail, ultimately without consultation
with socially or historically real others, arbitrary decisionism. As with
laws, however, the making and enforcement of political rules neces-
sarily involves the input of all those affected by a particular policy
decision. The off-hand dismissal of the jurisprudential usefulness of
discourse theory by many critics is justified only if the question of
legitimacy is to be banished from questions of the law.
47. Ibid., 59.
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss2/2
McCormick
B. Between Formalist and Vitalist Notions of Constitutional
Democracy
To establish more firmly accountability within his discourse theory
of legality, Habermas reconstructs the mutual relationship of facticity
and validity, 8 which had traditionally been treated as separate and
even competing entities in the self-understanding of German legal
sociology and philosophy. While the Weimar ghost of Schmitt is
treated in a mostly subtextual manner in the work, Habermas directly
addresses Schmitt's Weimar interlocutor, Kelsen. It is, after all, the
latter's legal positivism, a version of progressive legal theory inherited
from the context of Weimar, that sought to render state activity
accountable to popular sovereignty through procedural means.49
Habermas finds the Kelsenian tradition of procedural jurisprudence
overly susceptible to "realist" dismissal by present-day hyper-empirical
interpreters such as Luhmann, who may share none of Schmitt's
political predilections, but whose skepticism regarding normativity
may corrode, in an equally devastating manner, the substantive
efficacy of communicative power's expression in procedural legality.
Weber's sociology of law, with its thin notion of legal validity, left
unresolved the riddle of whether mere legality could entail
legitimacy.5 ° Whether the simple fact of the law-its recognition or
its formal validity-was sufficient to render it substantively rational or
legitimate is central to Habermas's analysis. Whereas Schmitt cynically
answered the riddle in the negative in Legality and Legitimacy,51 and
Luhmann, on the basis of sociological assumptions similar to those
held by Weber and Schmitt, answered it with a weak affirmative in
Legitimation Through Procedures,52 Kelsen's constitutional theory is
the most elaborate effort to solve definitively this dilemma in favor
of formal proceduralism. Habermas had subtitled his earlier treatment
of legal theory explicitly in terms of this riddle, "How Is Legitimacy
Possible on the Basis of Legality?" in "Law and Morality" 53-- but it
48. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 416.
49. In a compelling interpretation, Dhananjai Shivakumar emphasizes Kelsen's affinities with
Weber's neo-Kantianism over his more generally-discussed relationship to Kantianism writ large
in an effort to preserve the viability of Kelsen's jurisprudential methodology. See Shivakumar,
"The Pure Theory of Law." As I will discuss below, Habermas attempts to address the
deficiencies of both Weberian and Kelsenian methodologies, though himself employing
something of a neo-Kantian approach.
50. See Johannes Winckelmann, Legitimitat und Legalitidt im Max Webers Her-
rschaftssoziologie (Ttlbingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1952).
51. Schmitt, Legalitait und Legitimitdt.
52. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren. On Luhmann and Schmitt, see Cohen and
Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 323-25.
53. Habermas, "Law and Morality."
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is in Between Facts and Norms that he fully engages Kelsen's
theory. 4
Accepting Weber's diagnosis of modernity, which posits the
destruction of the legitimating force of natural law by the polytheism
of a pluralizing enlightenment,55 and also acknowledging that the
overtly formalist solutions of the early modern period do not hold
sufficient legitimating potential on either normative or empirical
grounds,56 Habermas lays out two alternative versions of modern
validity, both previously analyzed by Weber: the factually based,
empirically ascertained notion that registers average compliance with
the law, and the normatively inclined notion of subjective recognition
of the law's legitimacy.57 As noted, both are fundamentally unstable
conceptions; in the former, the subjective aspect of the participant's
attitude toward the law is rendered unimportant in comparison to her
possibly coerced factual compliance with it, while in the latter this
subjective disposition is rendered inaccessible to social-scientific
observation and hence potentially indeterminate. In the first, the
subject is conceived of as a strategic actor for whom the law is merely
a fact that structures behavior. In the second, the subject "believes in"
the law with no assuredly rational account as to why, or whether, she
will continue to do so and with no observable or necessary link with
the structure of the law itself.58 Thus, in Habermas's estimation,
neither instrumentalism nor conventionalism are sufficiently substan-
tive orientations toward the law to ameliorate the risk of coercion and
promote the primacy of communicative over administrative power.59
Kelsen's legal positivism remains a sophisticated attempt to
combine these two notions of validity by transposing the requisite but
inaccessible normativity of the subjective participant into the
procedures of the law itself, thus cushioning the potential coerciveness
of the law's positive facticity in state enforcement. However,
Habermas perceptively illustrates how the attempt to embed
normativity within institutional procedures of lawmaking that forsake
the connection with subjective personalities defers too much to factual
necessity. For Kelsen, the positive quality of a law itself renders that
54. For a more general overview of legal positivism, see the classics H.L.A. Hart, Essays in
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Lon L. Fuller, The
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); and Joseph Raz, The Morality of
Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). See also more recent considerations by Anthony J.
Sebok, "Misunderstanding Positivism," Michigan Law Review 93 (1995) and Michael Stokes,
"Formalism, Realism and the Concept of Law," Law and Philosophy 13 (1994).
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law legitimate; the fact that it was made through a set of procedures
that can ultimately be traced back through other pre-arranged
procedures to a previously established popular sanction renders it
correct. Hence, for Habermas, Kelsen's famous "ought" in his
"normativist" scheme of jurisprudence is ultimately "empirical" and
not "deontological" because it is constituted by state sanction and
divorced from continuous interaction with subjectively normative
imperatives. In Kelsen's elaborate architectonic construction of
multiple, hierarchically arranged levels of norms, the persons who
initially author these norms are eclipsed soon after the act of
authorship.' Kelsen thus encourages those approaches to law that
devote attention only to the already established formal procedures
that themselves quickly expose the law's lack of normative resonance:
"Once the moral and natural person has been uncoupled from the
legal system, there is nothing to stop jurisprudence from conceiving
rights along purely functional lines. This doctrine of rights hands on
the baton to a systems theory that rids itself by methodological fiats
of all normative considerations.
'61
Drawing upon the arguments he had expounded as early as 1963 in
his classic essay "Dogmatism, Reason, Decision, 62 Habermas
unmasks the actual fluidity between one-sided approaches that
emphasize either facticity or validity by demonstrating how a
Kelsenian normativity is ultimately reliant upon a decisionist moment,
a moment reminiscent of the Schmittian theory of "decisionism"
against which it is opposed in its own self-understanding. 63 The
tracing of the legality of all statutes to a basic will at the constitution's
founding that serves as the "ground-norm" from which all others
derive ultimately amounts to a might-makes-right proposition and
leaves administrative directives beyond the reach of communicative
regulation. Normativism hence "exhausts itself in the legalism of a
political domination construed in positivist terms."' The democratic
potential of this sovereign will is thus rendered static and normatively
unaccountable; according to Habermas, in a theory like Kelsen's:
[T]he source from whence positive law may derive its legitimacy
is not successfully explained. To be sure, the source of all
60. Ibid., 86.
61. Ibid., 87. For different assessments of Kelsen, see Joseph Raz, "The Purity of the Pure
Theory," in Essays on Kelsen, ed. Richard Tur and William Twining (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986); Stanley L. Paulson, "Kelsen's Legal Theory: The Final Round," Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 12 (1992); and Peter C. Caldwell, "Legal Positivism and Weimar Democracy," American
Journal of Jurisprudence 39 (1995).
62. "Dogmatism, Reason and Decision: On Theory and Practice in Our Scientific Society,"
in JUrgen Habermas on Society and Politics, ed. Steven Seideman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
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legitimacy lies in the democratic lawmaking process, and this in
turn calls on the principle of popular sovereignty. But the legal
positivism, or Gesetzespositivismus, propounded in the Weimar
period by professors of public law does not introduce this
principle in such a way that the intrinsic moral content of the
classical liberties ... is preserved. In one way or another, the
intersubjective meaning of legally defined liberties is overlooked
65
Kelsen's type of legal formalism is not interactively dynamic in that
it does not insure that the imperatives of administrative power remain
accountable to the democratic will. Once this will is all but
metaphysically constituted in a founding act, or less dramatically in a
parliamentary election, it has insufficient means continually to
influence systemic forces. Through his discourse theory, however,
Habermas purports to infuse Kelsen's merely formal characteristics of
the law with a normative substance that ensures its legitimacy: "The
law receives its full normative sense neither through its legal form per
se [e.g., Kelsenian positivism], nor through an a priori moral content
[e.g., natural law or Rawlsian liberalism], but through a procedure of
lawmaking that begets legitimacy."' To be more specific, if at every
level of opinion- and will-formation, and law- and policy-making,
there obtain the structures that facilitate those full communicative
interactions that lead to general assent, then the formality of legality
can be rendered substantively legitimate:
If discourses.., are the site where a rational will can take shape,
then the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a com-
municative arrangement: As participants in rational discourses,
consociates under law must be able to examine whether a
contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of
all those affected.67
In contrast to both Kelsen and Schmitt, who presuppose a static will
at the original moment of a constitution's founding,' Habermas
theorizes a process of will-formation-a "concept of the political" that
is alternative to both the liberal and authoritarian ones69 -that is
open to constant change but that remains stable in its adherence to
the procedures themselves: "The preferences entering into the





69. Ibid., 150-51. See Ulrich K. Preup, "Communicative Power and the Concept of Law,"
Cardozo Law Review 17 (1996).
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inputs that, open to the exchange of arguments, can be discursively
changed.,70 The universality of "general assent" or "reasonable
consensus" engendered by such proceedings insures legitimacy that
may be defined in terms of lifeworld control of the system.71 Accor-
ding to Habermas, a discourse theory of popular sovereignty poses no
danger to liberty because it necessitates the assent of all affected and
is characterized by a requirement of deference to more rational
arguments in general discussion, including those regarding the very
definition of rights previously conceived of as pre-political and
potentially untouchable.72
Moreover, for Habermas, subsequent liberal attempts to shore up
the deficiencies of the normative framework perform scarcely better
in addressing the Weberian normative void preserved by Kelsen.
Rawls, for instance, ignores the factual side altogether, thus providing
a reverse image of Kelsen who, for his part, pays too much attention
to legal form and not enough to its potentially normative content.73
However, Habermas's desire to build legitimacy into the legal order
entails abandonment neither of Rawlsian ethical-political normativity
nor of Kelsenian formal-legal normativity. In fact, the latter still holds
a particular attraction for Habermas. Because of the Kantian
inclinations of the work, which will be discussed below, Habermas
deems "economical and elegant" certain characteristics of the liberal
statute-positivism tradition, of which Kelsen is the greatest represen-
tative, and he remarks that they "still have a certain suggestive power
even today."74 He is herein referring specifically to the fact that
statutes are parliamentarily produced and general in character, as well
as subsumptive in form; that is, these statutes presuppose the
hierarchy of the constitution over the legislature and the latter over
the executive.75
70. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 162-68, 181.
71. Ibid., 147, 155. Habermas's emphasis on the potential for unanimous agreement in
societal and parliamentary will- and opinion-formation has already sparked vigorous commen-
tary. In addition to Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy, see William Rehg and
James Bohman, "Discourse and Democracy: The Formal and Informal Bases of Legitimacy in
Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996); William E.
Scheuerman, "Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic Theory in Habermas's Between
Facts and Norms," (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, San Francisco, 29 August-1 September 1996); Baynes, "Democracy and the
Rechtsstaat," and Simone Chambers, "Discourse and Democratic Practices," in White, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Habermas; Charles Larmore, "The Foundations of Modern
Democracy: Reflections on JUrgen Habermas," European Journal of Philosophy 3 (1994);
Bernhard Peters, "On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory," Philosophy & Social Criticism
20 (1994); and Robert Alexy, "Basic Rights and Democracy in Habermas' Procedural Paradigm
of the Law," Ratio Juris 7 (1994).
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Having elaborated his reconstruction of the Kelsenian theory of
formal law, essentially a substantive theory of legal procedure, and
having pointed out the relationship of Kelsen's theory of popular
sovereignty with those more authoritarian ones against which it is
opposed in its self-understanding, Habermas is careful to distance his
own conception of popular sovereignty from Rousseauian cum
Schmittian interpretations, in which the political will of an empirically
and physically existing collective group or community is prioritized
over formal legal and constitutional matters. 76 In fact, Habermas
appears to be so deeply concerned by the implications of this
concretist notion of democracy that it often clouds his thinking in
other areas.
For instance, the shadow of Schmitt prevents Habermas from
seriously considering the creative and productive use of the executive
branch exhibited in the separation of powers and checks and balances
in various constitutional contexts; e.g., that the executive might hold
some leverage over the other branches through agenda-setting or
popular appeals not necessarily plebiscitary in character. On the
contrary, Habermas asserts rather curtly that such functions "are
excluded" from his theory and raises in retort the ominous specter of
Fihrerdemokratie:
Anyone who would want to replace a constitutional court by
appointing the head of the executive branch as the 'Guardian of
the Constitution'-as Carl Schmitt wanted to do in his day with
the German president-thwarts the meaning of the separation of
powers in the constitutional state into its very opposite.
77
Despite his somewhat extreme stance in this particular instance,
Habermas is correct to criticize constitutional theorists like Bruce
Ackerman, and to a lesser extent Frank Michelman and Werner
Becker, for unwittingly reviving quasi-Schmittian notions of
democracy. Habermas expresses grave reservations regarding
Ackerman's "vitalist" constitutional approach, which he associates
with the Schmittian notion of Ausnahmezustand or the "exception" ;78
he softens this charge somewhat in reference to Michelman,79 as well
as to Becker, in whose empiricist (that is, overly "faktische") account
of democracy Habermas finds shades of decisionism. ° In fact, at
times it seems as though Habermas's own discourse-theoretic
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tinction to monolithic) expressions of popular will, is expressly
formulated in opposition to a Schmittian notion of democracy.81
Thus Habermas can be understood to have solved the dilemma left
by Weber's analytical approach to law. The normative vacuum found
in Weber's account is filled by Habermas's discourse theory of law,
which postulates that law can be formulated in such a way as to
garner the assent of all those to whom it applies. This rules out the
potential coercion entailed in arbitrary enforcement of the law over
particular subjects and the potential irrationality of a formalist
conception that allows for any outcome to be deemed valid provided
it has complied with established procedure. Because the procedures
themselves, as conceived by Habermas, are infused with the possibility
of coercion-free communication and are amenable to change on the
bases of such communication, the formalism of the law is neither
empty nor irrational. Moreover, because the will to which law-making
and -enforcement are accountable is not theorized as a singular
homogenous will, as conceived by competing Schmittian and
Kelsenian constitutional notions, but is instead understood as
anonymous and manifold, Habermas avoids the irrational excesses of
nationalist or homogeneity-enforcing expressions of democracy.
82
Below I criticize Habermas's privileging of a transhistorical, Kantian
approach to law over Hegel's historically specific one. However, here
Habermas's flight from Hegel serves him well in at least one regard:
He refrains from elaborating the particular qualities of the institutions
that constitute the law-making transition from lifeworld to law itself,
or of those institutions by which law fastens the interests of the
lifeworld to the system. While many will consider this omission a
flaw," Habermas is consistent in leaving the determination of these
institutions to the decisions of his deliberating democratic publics and
not to the ruminations of German philosophers.84
81. Ibid., 136, 563, n.75. This is not, however, the occasion to discuss the complicated and
controversial issue of Habermas's intellectual relationship with Schmitt. On this issue, see Ellen
Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School," Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical
Thought 71 (1987), and the accompanying responses by Martin Jay, "Reconciling the
Irreconcilable? Rejoinder to Kennedy"; Ulrich K. Preup, "The Critique of German Liberalism:
Reply to Kennedy"; and Alfons S6llner, "Beyond Carl Schmitt: Political Theory in the Frankfurt
School" (ibid.). See also Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 201-54.
82. For further accounts of a discourse theory of law, see Dyzenhaus, "The Legitimacy of
Legality"; Rosenfeld, "Law as Discourse"; Baynes, "Democracy and the Rechtsstaat"; and David
Sciulli, Theory of Social Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
83. See Chambers, "Discourse and Democratic Practices."
84. This includes even considerations as cogent and rigorous as those found in G.W.F. Hegel,
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991). See Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David G. Carlson, eds., Hegel and Legal
Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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The project is not without problems, however. Habermas sacrifices
a degree of contemporary relevance by seeking to solve the normative
deficit of Weber's sociology of law through his own discourse theory
of law, supplanting Weber's simple state/society model with his own
more differentiated system/lifeworld one. While Habermas is able to
assume a normative potential in the civil societies, public spheres, and
discursive publics of the lifeworld by transferring into the system the
potentially coercive instrumental rationality of the market and
coupling it with the strategic rationality of the state, he still explicitly
assumes a nation-state configuration within which this rearrangement
takes place." Indeed, while this would be a perfectly acceptable
approach to the aporia of Weberian legal theory within Weber's own
context of an emerging and soon hegemonic welfare state, its
adequacy is questionable for an empirical reality where threats to the
communicative rationality of the lifeworld are posed by economic
imperatives whose sources lie increasingly beyond the purview of a
particular state apparatus acting in accord with the will collected from
a particular lifeworld.8 6 In other words, whereas the coercion
generated by either social, state, or economic forces might have been
tamed by Habermas's model of law in a scenario where the state had
the capacity to act as the agent of the lifeworld and was instructed to
enforce policies by the latter through the institution of law, in a
situation where such state capacities are diminished by economic
globalization, state decentralization, and nation-state interdependence,
there are risks of pathological attacks on the lifeworld that
increasingly lie beyond the control of the state.'
To be more specific, should a particular multinational corporation
decide to withdraw from a particular nation, the state may have little
leverage to keep that company within its borders and hence little
power to address the economic hardship to be suffered by its
85. This and other ramifications of Habermas's isomorphic and state-centric understanding
of the relationship of the economy and the state within the system-lifeworld model are
elaborated in Brenner, "The Limits of Civil Society."
86. Here I bracket the serious objections raised by critics of Habermas's underestimation
of the extensive coercion that pervades the lifeworld itself and indeed the kind of normative
rationality that obtains in the system. See Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory?"
87. On the importance of these kinds of considerations for democratic theory, see Brenner,
"The Limits of Civil Society"; John Dunn, "Political Science, Political Theory and Policy-Making
in an Interdependent World," Government and Opposition 28 (1993); David Held and Anthony
McGrew, "Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State," Government and Opposition 28
(1993); John Dunn, ed., Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); and
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). John Rawls, the foremost Anglo-
American legal-political democratic theorist, has only recently begun to consider the
ramifications of international relations for his theory of justice. See John Rawls, "The Law of
Peoples," in On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan
Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
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lifeworld. The ensuing unemployment to be experienced in this
lifeworld will have a direct effect on the communicative capabilities
of the discursive publics that are supposed to participate vigorously in
the law- and policy-making process that directs the operations of the
state and economy.88 Or, as is more likely the case in these days of
corporate-conciliatory state policy,89 should a state negotiate a
settlement with a transnational corporation by which the company
remains within the state's territory at the cost of the state's tax
revenue vis-A-vis the corporation, the state compromises its ability to
redistribute wealth within society. Since state welfare policy is one of
the chief means by which the lifeworld uses legal direction of the
system to regulate social inequality within its domain, its subversion
engenders the same cycle of denatured and deformed communicative
possibilities and participation as the previous example.9 ° Therefore,
Habermas's reconstruction of the normative status of law left vacant
by Weber's sociology to some extent undermines its contemporary
efficacy by relying on a rearrangement of Weber's state-society model
within a system-lifeworld one without questioning the nation-state
parameters of both models. This is a theme I will take up below in
considerations of Habermas's attempt to solidify his legal theory by
addressing judicial adjudication (C) and his attempt to solve what I
have identified above as the historical dilemma of law in the transition
to the twentieth-century welfare state, a dilemma left unresolved in
Weber's sociology of law (D).
C. Excursus: Interactive Adjudication
There is already considerable precedent in classical liberal
literature, and certainly in Habermas's earlier works, regarding the
appropriate methods by which to build into the societal and par-
liamentary processes of will-formation and lawmaking the kind of
communicative structures Habermas advocates.91 But in offering a
comprehensive account of how modern law facilitates the potential for
democratic communicative power to keep in check the threats posed
88. See Charles Tilly, "Globalization Threatens Labor's Rights," working paper 182, New
School for Social Research/Center for Studies of Social Change, New York, 1994.
89. See Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (1996).
90. In a recent essay, Habermas concedes the existence of this kind of problem and proposes
as a solution the elevation of his discourse theory of constitutional democracy to supra-national
levels such as those of the European Union (hereinafter EU). See Jflrgen Habermas, "The
European Nation State-its Achievements and its Limits: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty
and Citizenship," Europaische Zeitschrift fUr Recht, Philosophie und Informatik 2 (1995). I
address the adequacy of this solution below.
91. See Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15
(1987); John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990); and David Miller, "Deliberative Democracy and Social
Choice," Political Studies 40 (1992).
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by systemic power in the state and the economy at every institutional
level,92 Habermas is compelled also to give an account of how com-
municative procedures can be built into the post-parliamentary-and
traditionally only quasi-democratically legitimate-judicial branch of
government. Specifically, he addresses the question of how law is to
be interpreted "with both internal consistency and rational external
justification so as to guarantee simultaneously the certainty of law and
its rightness."93 Habermas carefully considers three post-natural law
alternatives (hermeneutics, realism, positivism), as well as the
sophisticated proposals of Ronald Dworkin and Klaus Ginther,
before setting forth his own approach.94
Therefore, before addressing in section (D) how Habermas answers
the historical quandary left by Weber's sociology of law, in this
section, I discuss Habermas's theory of jurisprudential interpretive
theory and practice, also resolved unsatisfactorily by Weber. In a
famous passage from "The Sociology of Law," Weber compares
conceptions of the judge as on the one hand a vending machine into
whose head the appropriate statutes and case materials are poured
and from whose mouth pops forth the eternally correct decision, and
on the other an unbounded creator of law who negotiates the
fundamentally unbridgeable gap between rule and case with his or her
own ultimately arbitrary decision.95 These two paradigms confront
each other as judge-as-automaton versus judge-as-lawgiver. 96 In
Economy and Society and elsewhere, Weber is ambivalent as to which
model obtains more closely in reality. Habermas seeks to move
beyond these alternatives and their contemporary expressions in his
own confrontation with the question of judicial adjudication.
According to Habermas, the alternative of legal hermeneutics is too
democratically compromised as a result of its dependence on received
judicial tradition, however loosely conceived, for it to serve as a viable
interpretive model for the law. Habermas is nevertheless careful to
acknowledge its sophistication in approaching the complex relation-
ship between a rule and its application: The context or situation of
application is to some extent defined by being brought into proximity
92. On the important differences between the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary modes
of communication in Habermas's "two-track" approach, see Baynes, "Democracy and the
Rechtsstaat," 216.
93. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 199.
94. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1977); A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Law's Empire
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986); as well as Klaus Gtinther, The
Sense of Appropriateness: Application Discourses in Morality and Law (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1993).
95. Weber, Economy and Society, 979, 756; cf. 656, 811, 895, 1395.
96. Ibid., 758, 894; see also 979, 1395.
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with a law, while the law is only made concrete in its application to
a specific case.
97
In much the same way that he theoretically undresses poststruc-
turalism elsewhere, Habermas reveals legal realism's inability to
justify its own normative goals once it has exposed as ideology the
normative claims of the judicial system as ideology in its reduction of
law to politics and its emphasis on the naked value preferences of
judges.9" Legal positivism, according to Habermas, is closed to both
social context and vested interest, rendering it unresponsive to the
needs of substantive democracy. Moreover, Habermas reiterates his
distrust of the decisionism latent within the positivist theory of
adjudication: Given the strict formalism of positivism, when the rule
is unclear because of the inevitable indeterminacy of language, the
judge is given unnecessarily wide discretion.99
Habermas finds much more of value for linking a theory of legal
coherency with legal legitimacy in the philosophy of Dworkin.
Dworkin's distinction of principles and rules bypasses both positivist
and anti-positivist responses to the apparent indeterminacy of the law:
only the conflict of either/or rules makes for decisionistic resolution.
Principles, on the other hand, do not have this zero-sum quality."°
Habermas is inclined to accept Dworkin's call for a work-in-progress
approach to legal principles wherein coherency follows from-rather
than is presupposed by-the principles themselves (as in the conse-
quently, and justifiably, more often criticized Rawlsian approach). For
Dworkin, according to Habermas, "the task does not consist in the
philosophical construction of a well-ordered society whose basic
institutions would embody principles of justice [but rather] in the
discovery of valid principles and policies in the light of which a given,
concrete legal order can be justified in its essential elements such that
all the individual decisions fit into it as parts of a coherent
whole."'101
Habermas also finds in Dworkin the grounds to refute the radical
critique of legal theory launched by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement-the contemporary manifestation of the legal realist assault
on formal law that also happens, wittingly or unwittingly, to reproduce
some of the arguments used by the radical right in its Weimar assault
on liberal law.1"Q CLS claims that the everyday workings of judges





102. On this comparison, see Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception. On CLS
in general, see Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1976); Mark
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reflect their own interests, attitudes, and biases that the judges then
"rationalize" with principles and policies which hide the "objective
indeterminacy of the law."1" Habermas claims that this supposed
"internal indeterminacy" does not result from the structure of the law
but rather from judges' failure to put forth the best arguments in
particular cases. Moreover, the institutional history to which judges
are obliged to resort often resists rational reconstruction in ad-
judication."°
Thus, with the aid of Dworkin, and Giinther as well, Habermas
undermines the once reactionary, now supposedly progressive,
strategy of reducing all cases to "exceptions" and utilizing the ensuing
expos6 of the indeterminacy of the liberal rule of law as the point of
departure for a wholesale overhaul of it. According to Habermas,
CLS claims that there is no coherency to liberal-democratic law,
hence no justice. Habermas, Dworkin, and GUnther argue that CLS
confuses rules with principles; the former collide in irreconcilable ways
but, unlike the latter, do not constitute the workings of justice as such.
All principles are necessarily indeterminate because they do not apply
themselves. They must be examined to see if another principle better
conforms to a particular case. 5 In application, all suitable nor-
mative reasons must be collected and then the situation itself
interpreted:
If the "collision" between norms being weighed in the
interpretive process led one to infer a "contradiction" within the
system of norms itself, then one would be confusing the norm's
"validity," which it enjoys in general insofar as it is justified, with
its "appropriateness" for application in particular cases. If instead
one explains the indeterminacy of valid norms in terms of
argumentation theory, then a contest of norms competing as
prima facie candidates for application in a given case makes good
methodological sense. °
Habermas suggests that those fixated on indeterminacy themselves
expect a predetermined outcome in the judicial process that falsely
begs the result they already desire: the "trashing" of the legal system.
Drawing upon the work of Lon Fuller, Habermas sets out the ap-
propriate expectations of the legal system: "not certainty of outcome
but a discursive clarification of the pertinent facts and legal questions.
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Alan
Hunt and Peter Fitzpatrick, Critical Legal Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); and Andrew
Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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Thus affected parties can be confident that in procedures issuing in
judicial decisions only relevant reasons will be decisive, and not
arbitrary ones."' 7
But in section III of chapter V, Habermas parts company with both
Dworkin and GUnther. By placing far too much emphasis on the
individual judge-likening her to "Hercules"-Dworkin is too
"monologic" for Habermas. And Gunther, by making too strong a
distinction between rules and principles as well as justification and
application, endangers the very legal determinacy he seeks to uphold,
because for Habermas the way in which something is rationally
justified cannot be wholly divorced from the manner in which (and
means with which) it is applied. As a solution to these deficiencies,
Habermas introduces his "dialogic approach" to adjudication, an
approach that takes into account multiple perspectives in the process:
Whether norms and values could find the rationally motivated
assent of all those affected can be judged only from the inter-
subjectively enlarged perspective of the first person plural. This
perspective integrates the perspectives of each participant's
worldview and self-understanding in a manner that is neither
coercive nor distorting. The practice of argumentation recom-
mends itself for such a universalized ideal role taking practiced
in common. As the reflective form of communicative action,
argumentation distinguishes itself socio-ontologically, one might
say, by a complete reversibility of participant perspectives that
unleashes the higher-level intersubjectivity of the deliberating
collective. In this way Hegel's concrete universal is sublimated
into a communicative structure purified of all substantial ele-
ments.'08
There is much more that could be said here with respect to the
substantive qualities of Habermas's own legal hermeneutics. 9
However, I would like to raise questions about the way in which
Habermas decontextualizes legal theory in Between Facts and Norms,
the ramifications of which again threaten the contemporary pertinence
of his theses. While Habermas has never engaged in the crude
reduction of ideas to some socio-economic or materialist base, from
his very first work, The Structural Transformation of the Public
107. Ibid. at 220. For recent reinterpretations of the way out of certain dead ends of legal
positivism without resort to the left-nihilism of CLS via the work of Fuller, see Dyzenhaus,
"Legitimacy of Legality" and Sciulli, Theory of Social Constitutionalism. See also Stanley L.
Paulson, "Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch and the 'Positivist' Theses," Law and Philosophy 13
(1994).
108. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 228.
109. See Stephen M. Feldman, "The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic
Standards in Postmodem Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas and Civic
Republicanism," Georgetown Law Journal 81 (1993).
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Sphere, he demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the way
that theoretical positions, philosophical ideas, and cultural understan-
dings interacted with particular socio-historical moments. For instance,
when discussing the status of the "bourgeois public sphere," he made
it clear that although that sphere was located within the complex of
nineteenth-century, liberal, laissez-faire capitalist societies, it could not
be reduced to the mere ideological expression of them."'
In Between Facts and Norms, however, Habermas seems to have
ceased to inquire about the socio-historical status of theoretical
utterances and has instead come to take them almost exclusively at
intellectual face value-that is, purely at the level of theory.
Throughout the work, particularly when treating competing
interpretive strategies of jurisprudence, the question for Habermas is
almost exclusively one of principles and how they are interpreted and
not one of the moment that informs and to some extent motivates a
particular emergence of principles."' As I will elaborate further in
section (E), just as Habermas does not sufficiently contextualize
within a transformation of state and society in the early twentieth
century the neo-Kantian categories of Weber's sociology of law
(facticity and validity) and the ensuing Weimar jurisprudential debates
over these positions, he does not locate the contemporary legal-
theoretical controversies of constitutional adjudication addressed
above in their own changing historical context. In other words, many
of the legal-theoretical positions analyzed by Habermas and
explicated above might have been more comprehensively treated had
they been examined on socio-historical grounds along with ratio-
normative ones. Habermas fails to entertain the issue of whether the
competition between the reformed formalism of Dworkin, Raz, and
Rawls, and the chauvinistic anti-formalism of CLS are themselves
characteristic of a crisis of the state in the post-Fordist Western
European and North American countries,' just as such a com-
petition was indicative earlier this century of crisis and change in legal
debates in Germany and elsewhere. It is remarkable that the "indeter-
minacy" thesis, one of the subtexts of Weimar debates during the
transition to the welfare state, should again emerge with such vitality
in a post-1970s transition away from this model. These arguments
about the purported prevalence of legal indeterminacy remained
largely the possession of neo-conservatives and were not taken
110. Habermas, Structural Transformation, 160, 257.
111. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 252.
112. See Bob Jessop, "Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on
Post-Fordist Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy 40 (1993); and Gosta Esping-
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completely seriously during the period of welfare state stability in the
decades immediately following World War II.113 If these are
plausible considerations, then some questions ought to be posed and
addressed:
* Are CLS and its post-structuralist fellow travelers perhaps
the ideological opposite of a neo-formalism of Rawls, Dworkin,
and Raz, the latter seeking to grant the state a leeway in
intervention that it is increasingly incapable of achieving under
present constraints?
* Is the former an attempt to spur the materialization of
welfare state law in the name of a purportedly progressive nor-
mative agenda that it has itself helped to undermine through its
"trashing" of formal law and the generalizable rationality that
accompanies it?
e Is there significance to the fact that the arguments employed
by legal realism during the "progressive era" to justify quite
plausible state intervention in the name of social justice are today
replicated by CLS in the name of goals so clearly
uninstitutionalizable that CLS actually provides the "farce" to
follow on the heels of realism's "tragedy," in the social-
philosophical sense?
a Just as substantivist/anti-formalist strategies at moments of
social transformation (like those of CLS) may reflect a
Nietzschean bravado with respect to the possibility of expressing
an existential will over a decaying structure formerly considered
immutable,1 4 might not Kantian formalism as practiced by
Rawls, Dworkin, and Raz serve as socio-psychological retreat at
such moments of qualitative change?
* Do formal categories offer a refuge from a concrete world
perceived as ever more "complex" and indecipherable according
to familiar theoretical equipment, just as "indeterminacy" reflects
a certain theoretical exhilaration-belying-despair over such a
scenario?1 5
113. The champion of this position was, of course, Friedrich A. Hayek. See Friedrich A.
Hayek, Law, Liberty, and Legislation: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and
Political Economy, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
114. See Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
115. Fortunately there is some dialogue between the Kantian formalist and Nietzschean anti-
formalist approaches to law-both of which assume social complexity as a "fact"-as reflected
by the debate between Charles Larmore and Drucilla Cornell. See Drucilla Cornell, "Time,
Deconstruction and the Challenge to Legal Positivism: The Call for Judicial Responsibility," Yale
Journal of Law and the Humanities 2 (1990), and Larmore's response, Charles Larmore, "Law,
Morality, and Autopoiesis in Niklas Luhmann," Cardozo Law Review 13 (1992).
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Again, the exploration of such intentionally provocative and
potentially loaded questions is not to encourage the reduction of ideas
to, for instance, socio-economic forces. It is, however, to suggest that
their relationship is still worthy of exploration, at least according to
Habermas's own methodological-political aims as first expressed in
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
6
To sum up this section on the intricacies of Habermas's critique of
contemporary legal interpretation, which includes his critique of legal
hermeneutics, legal realism, and legal positivism, his critical ap-
propriation of Dworkin and Ginther, and his rather devastating
assault on CLS,"7 I say this: Rather than inquire into the socio-
political context of the legal theories in question, Habermas tends to
take them at intellectual face value, i.e., exclusively at the level of
their logical principles and normative justifications. One of the
implications of the arguments developed above, however, is that an
adequate engagement of contemporary legal theories necessarily
entails examination not only of their ratio-normative defensibility but
also of their relation to contemporary societal dynamics such as the
status of the state, as well as statutory and constitutional law, under
conditions of a declining postwar welfare state and emerging scenarios
of economic globalization and international multilateralism.
The fact that the "indeterminacy of law" emerges as a theme of
legal debate during both the Weimar Republic and the present socio-
historical juncture raises the question of whether there are any
structural similarities between these respective contexts. Such
similarities may indeed be found in dramatic, if qualitatively different,
crises of the state. The questions posed above are the kinds of
questions that a critical theory of law would at least have to consider,
if not necessarily greet with an "amen." Had Habermas positioned
himself vis-A-vis his interlocutors in such a manner-certainly without
ignoring the normative-rational weight of their positions-he would
perhaps have thought about the relationship between validity and
facticity, determinacy and indeterminacy in different, more historically
sensitive, ways. This problem of failing to historicize normative
prescriptions adequately is central in the next section as I examine
116. Brenner, "Limits of Civil Society" and Scheuerman, "Between Radicalism and Resig-
nation" both hold Habermas to the political-methodological standards of this work, while Nancy
Fraser and Margaret Somers evaluate the progressive potential of the book's content today. See
Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," and Margaret R. Somers, "What's Political or Cultural
about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept For-
mation," Sociological Theory 13 (1995) and "Narrating and Naturalizing Anglo-American
Citizenship Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere," Sociological Theory
13 (1995).
117. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 194-204.
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Habermas's attempt to merge the respective advantages of the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century "paradigms" of law as a response
to the historical dilemma handed down to him by Weber. He under-
takes this task without ever seriously pausing to consider whether we
are in the midst of a new, twenty-first-century paradigm generated by
very real structural transformations, and not a paradigm that could be
created by the-however sophisticated-theoretical efforts of his work
or his response to previous moments of social change.
D. Selecting Nineteenth- or Twentieth-Century Paradigms of Law
One of the most remarkable aspects of Between Facts and Norms
is the way in which Habermas is able to synthesize the social scientific
and jurisprudential accounts of the transition of law from the
relatively laissez-faire conditions of the nineteenth century to the
state-interventionist scenario of the twentieth-a transition already
presciently perceived by Weber in what I identified above as the
"historical" aspect of his sociology of law. Habermas draws upon
classic accounts of the pathologies of welfare state law (e.g., Talcott
Parsons and Michel Foucault)," 8 as well as the best of the German
sociology and philosophy of law from the last twenty years (e.g.,
Dieter Grimm, Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenffrde, Erhard Denninger,
Ulrich K. Preu3, and Ingeborg Maus),1 9 to elaborate on the
ramifications of the "deformalization" or "materialization" of law that
ensues under welfare-state conditions.
Appropriating these authors, Habermas argues that the complicated
issue of the welfare state's deformalization or materialization of law
can be boiled down to a crisis of the separation of powers and of the
determinacy of legislative statutes. As the state intervenes in the
market for purposes of regulation and redistribution, "the classical
scheme for separating branches of government becomes less tenable
the more laws lose the form of conditional programs and assume
instead the shape of substantive goal-oriented programs."" ° Conse-
quently, the judicial and executive branches exercise considerable
discretion in the interpretation and application of laws that are no
longer formally specific."' This trend eventually generates the crisis
of what is now called the "indeterminacy of law": "As a rule these
'materialized' laws ... are formulated without proper nouns and
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normative intent of broad policies is lost in the vagaries of ap-
plication, or, conversely, policies with dubious normative content are
enforced arbitrarily by democratically unaccountable, bureaucratic, or
judicial officials."z
But it is Habermas's understanding of the cause of the shift from
formal to materialized law, as much as his understanding of its effects,
that to some extent determines the success of his endeavor to
transcend both kinds of law. He develops a method that allows for
selection of either type of law depending upon the discursively
derived choice of the collectivity affected by the proposed policy.
Habermas refers to laissez-faire-conducive formal law and welfare
state deformalized law as "the two most successful paradigms ...
which are still competing today," but does not clarify whether this
competition is played out on ideological or sociological terrain, or
indeed some synthesis of the two.124 Both laissez-faire and welfare
state law are embedded within specific socio-economic complexes, yet
Habermas makes no explicit attempt to ground his "higher third"-a
"reflexive" strategy of opting for one or the other-in the possibilities
afforded by present socio-economic conditions. It could be suggested
that Habermas's definitions of bourgeois rule of law and welfare-state
law are potentially voluntaristic, emphasizing the idealistic charac-
teristics of previous epochs in a way that obfuscates their socio-
structural characteristics, as well as those of the present crisis of the
state. For instance, Habermas attributes the motor of each respective
model to "claims of rights by market participants" on the one hand,
and "claims of entitlements by welfare clients" on the other. 5 In
short, these epochs were generated to a large extent by the demands
of social agents.
Habermas claims that "the social-welfare model emerged from the
reformist critique of bourgeois formal law," 26 thus underem-
phasizing the structural conditions that facilitated, if not forged, such
a model-conditions that were in fact the central subject of Haber-
mas's Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The constraints
on communicative action delineated in that book are given little
attention in Between Facts and Norms and seem to indicate that
Habermas already presupposes the substantive participatory state of
affairs that he encourages with his discourse theory of democracy.
123. On the issue of the indeterminacy of law, see the literature on CLS at note 99; on this
theme understood more generally in contemporary theory, see Benjamin Gregg, "Possibility of
Social Critique in an Indeterminate World," Theory & Society 23 (1994); and James Bohman,
New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of Indeterminacy (Oxford: Polity, 1991).
124. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 117.
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Such constraints are absent from Habermas's explanation of how
many of the so-called deficits of the welfare-state model turn out to
be largely matters of perspective on the parts of the particular sub-
jects:
It is only a particular paradigmatic understanding of law in
general that causes the objective legal content apparently to drop
out of some basic rights [in the welfare-state scenario]. This
understanding stems in turn from how a particular historical
situation was perceived through the lens of social theory, that is,
a situation in which the liberal middle class had to grasp, on the
basis of its interest position, how the principles of the
constitutional state could be realized. 27
The potentially voluntarist assumptions of Habermas's account are
perhaps best reflected by the very notion of "paradigm shifts"
referred to in the passage above, made famous by Thomas Kuhn."
Habermas repeatedly refers to the transition from liberal- to welfare-
state law in terms of such "paradigm shifts." '129 The Kuhnian con-
cept, however, suggests that the way in which objective conditions are
perceived by a particular community of observers is almost exclusively
determinate of its reality. It is this subjectivist understanding of legal
history that affords Habermas the opportunity-through the prospec-
tive choices of deliberating subjects within multifarious public
spheres-selectively to preserve and reject particular elements from
previous "paradigms" as ingredients of new ones at any moment of
law- or policy-making. Again, Habermas argues that paradigm shifts
are to be explained in terms of the perception that a particular
paradigm has become "dysfunctional." He promotes his "reflexive
strategy," a strategy that moves from one paradigm or the other
depending on the particular needs of deliberative law-making publics:
"Today the political legislator must choose from among formal,
material and procedural law according to the matter that requires
regulation."' 3 °
As a result of this approach, Habermas does not reflect upon the
status of his model in relation to the historical moment in which it
occurs; this context may not be amenable to either formal or material-
ized strategies of law (or some combination thereof), but rather may
entail wholly new options for wholly new circumstances. In this
respect it could be said that Habermas's reflexive strategy amounts to
127. Ibid., 251.
128. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962).
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a social-democratic philosophy of will, a philosophy that wavers
between the ideal constructions of the theorist and the demands,
perceptions, and expressions of particular social groups. As mentioned
above, Habermas has simultaneously sought to distance his theories
from potentially authoritarian notions of popular sovereignty as well
as seeking to avoid a construction that places philosopher/sociologist
as lawgiver. Through this paradigm-dependent analysis, Habermas, on
the one hand, leaves the discussion and decision over the mode of law
appropriate to a specific situation to the practices of the community
directly affected by it. On the other hand, on the basis of the socio-
historical presuppositions he has set out in advance, the options are
confined to one of either two, or if somehow combined, three such
possibilities. Yet because the relationship between the discursive
publics and the observations of the theorist on one side and
sociological reality on the other are not joined in a more explicit
manner, both remain potentially ideological.
For Habermas, because the conditions that obtained under the two
respective previous "paradigms" came to be seen as dysfunctional, this
fact-as much or more than the empirical reality of the actual dys-
functionality-becomes sufficient grounds for an ideally-created
supercession thereof. Habermas insists that "a social theory claiming
to be 'critical' cannot confine itself to describing the relationship of
norm and reality solely from the perspective of an observer.'
131
However, he seems to move to the opposite extreme in a different
section of Between Facts and Norms and therein appears to privilege
participants' perspectives or consciousness: "The tacit assumption that
these two paradigms exhausted the alternatives was questioned only
after the dysfunctional side effects of the successfully implemented
welfare state became pressing political issues., 132 It is therefore the
ensuing politicization that directly results in "the search for a new
paradigm beyond the familiar alternatives.,
133
Habermas claims that the newly theorized reflexive paradigm must
preserve the liberty-upholding and solidarity-instilling aspirations of
the two previous ones-the respective Rechts- and Sozialstaat para-
digms-without, like them, undermining the possibility of their
historical realization through the emergence of the pathologies
associated with them-socio-economic injustice and state paternalism,
respectively. He also insists that given present societal realities, his
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it hopes to preserve from the previous paradigms.134 On this basis,
in a telling passage he criticizes Ernst-Wolfgang BtckenfOrde's
nostalgia for certain irretrievable aspects of the nineteenth-century
formal rule of law:
The liberal paradigm of law is certainly not a simplifying descrip-
tion of a historical starting point that we could take at face value.
It tells us, rather, how the principles of the constitutional state
could be realized under the hypothetically assumed conditions of
a liberal economic society. This model stands and falls with the
social-theoretic assumptions of classical political economy, which
were already shaken by Marx's critique and no longer hold for
developed postindustrial societies in the West. In other words the
principles of the democratic constitutional state must not be
confused with one of its context-bound historical modes of
interpretation. 35
However, Habermas's supposed overcoming of the two paradigms of
law also "stands or falls" on "context-bound" assumptions about
social complexity in the welfare state that may "no longer hold for
developed postindustrial societies."
Habermas succinctly describes his strategy as follows:
The desired paradigm should satisfy the best description of
complex societies; it should illuminate once again the original idea
of the self-constitution of a community of free and equal legal
citizens [bourgeois rule of law]; and it should overcome the
rampant particularism of a legal order that, having lost its center
in adapting to the uncomprehended complexity of the social
environment, is unraveling bit by bit [welfare state materialized
law] 136
Habermas seeks to infuse the new paradigm with a normativity that
has been drained from social-scientific accounts by a "a functionalis-
tically prejudiced understanding of law fixated on government action"
that "conflates legitimacy and efficiency., 137 But his failure to give
an account of the socio-structural bases of the new paradigm, except
through repeated references to systemic "complexity," undermines its
potential efficacy. It thus would seem that Habermas's "third way" in
democratic constitutional theory is grounded upon a systems-theoretic
empirical reality upon which is superimposed a philosophically idealis-
tic "paradigm shift." That would render Habermas's conception of
134. Ibid., 249.
135. Ibid., 250.
136. Ibid., 393, first emphasis added.
137. Ibid., 434, 444, translation amended.
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present socioeconomic reality merely a further differentiating welfare-
state paradigm that already obtains in essence.
To this charge Habermas explicitly pleads guilty: "The social-
welfare project must neither be simply continued along the same lines
nor be broken off, but must be pursued at a higher level of reflec-
tion. ' This presupposes a socioeconomic structure already in place
and does not entertain the notion of its fundamental change. In The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas had
criticized the tendency to "derive the essence" of capitalism per se
from the "unique historical constellation" of laissez-faire capitalism in
Great Britain at the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth
century.139 However, Habermas's own tendency to derive the
essence of contemporary state-economy-society relations from the
equally historically unique model of the post-World War II welfare
state seriously hampers his attempt to ground sociologically his
contemporary normative project."4
The key issue here is therefore not whether Habermas's goal of
combining the strengths of the Rechts- and Sozialstaat paradigms is
normatively desirable, but whether in the attempt to preserve the
progressive qualities of each he has also absorbed the aporias of
Weberian or Luhmannian philosophies of history and epistemology
that were tied to these past contexts. Such philosophies would now
prevent the realization of his project at a present, potentially post-
Fordist or post-welfare-state, socio-political conjuncture. Habermas
correctly asserts that normative content has dropped out of systems-
differentiation theories of democracy. However, it is not clear whether
in the insufficient interrogation of the factual assertions of systems
theory that unfortunately accompanies his criticisms of its normative
shortcomings Habermas's effort is an attempt simply to stick such
normative content back in. It is further unclear whether this alone is
an adequate strategy for a contemporary sociology/philosophy of law.
Again, the conceptual components that constitute Habermas's title,
"facticity" and "validity," reflect two intellectual poles of the contem-
porary social-theoretic world: one an exclusively empirical orien-
tation-represented for Habermas by Luhmann-that completely
dismisses normative concerns from the purview of social research; the
other a political-philosophical theorization of justice-represented by
Rawls-that is inadequately attuned to the specificities of social
138. Ibid., 410.
139. Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 78-79.
140. Other efforts that more specifically historically contextualize Habermas's project in
terms of political economy are David Held, "Crisis Tendencies, Legitimation and the State," in
Habermas: Critical Debates, ed. John Thompson and David Held (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982),
193-94; and Brenner, "Limits of Civil Society."
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reality. However, Habermas does not bring together the two types of
analyses; that is, he seldom if ever questions whether the substance of
what emerges in the general analysis is in some way related to the
historical context that he describes in the sociological analysis.
These problems are more concretely exemplified in Habermas's
discussion of the feminist critique of formal and welfare state law.141
Habermas draws upon literature that demonstrates the various ways
in which women were marginalized and exploited under a formal law
paradigm blinded to women's needs by andro-centric notions of
neutrality, a paradigm that tacitly condoned the abuse of women in
the name of state non-intervention. He also acknowledges the feminist
indictment of the welfare-state legal paradigm that manipulated and
enforced female dependency through the promulgation of policies
over which women had little control. Habermas suggests that a new
legal paradigm might emerge from feminist "demands" for alternative
types of legal practice; that is, legislation and policies could be crafted
that draw upon the former traditions that prevent both state intrusion
and clientization of welfare recipients yet continue to provide the
substantive service and support of welfare-state policies. However,
once again his focus on the "demands" of the legal subjects in
question entails a neglect of the socio-structural context within which
these persons are situated. In this case Habermas's discussion of
feminist legal theory fails to consider the ways in which the increasing
number of women in the work force over the last twenty-five years
may have contributed to the changing political and legal agendas of
feminists, and occludes the necessity of taking into account present
possibilities and constraints.142
Thus, despite Habermas's references in the last chapter of Between
Facts and Norms to "historically situating" his project,143 to a
"structural transformation of society,"1" to the "qualitative transfor-
mation of state tasks," '145 and to "the unavoidable results of struc-
141. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 409-27. See Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and
Gender (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Carol Smart,
Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Iris M. Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Martha Minow, Making
all the Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). See also Patricia Smith, ed., Feminist
Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
142. For attempts to confront the transformation of the welfare state and the role of women
within it under globalization, see Anna Yeatman, "Women's Citizenship Claims, Labour Market
Policy and Globalization," Australian Journal of Political Science 27 (1991); and L. McDowell,
"Life Without Father and Ford: The New Gender Order of Post-Fordism," Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers 16 (1992).
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tural changes in state and society,"'" his conception of historical
change is ultimately grounded upon a notion of an "outmoded
paradigmatic understanding.,147 His attempt to transcend both
bourgeois formal law and welfare-state law models, as originally set
forth by Weber as a historical dilemma, amounts to an abstract
negation of each option against the other, an attempt to overcome
two historical pasts that is nevertheless itself theoretically blind to the
historical present.148 In his treatment of paradigm shifts, although he
eventually grapples with feminist literature on welfare state law,
Habermas reveals himself to be actually addressing those controver-
sies between left-liberals and neo-conservatives over welfare state
policy that were prefigured in Weber's writings, because the status of
the welfare state itself is taken for granted in such debates. While he
may concede that welfare-state reality is growing ever more complex,
he does not entertain the notion that it is changing qualitatively. This
sets up the paradox that on the one hand an extant scenario can be
reformed, but on the other its growing complexity suggests a situation
moving beyond the grasp of conscious choice and control. Lukdcs
perceived this same tension in Weber and offered a vision of how to
seize what was to him the immediately apparent dynamic of dramatic
change to promote progress: a notion of history that was precisely
under the control of those human actors who needed to be made
aware of it, instead of a notion that portrayed these actors as beguiled
into passivity and resignation by linear and deterministic notions of
ever increasing societal rationalization. These are themes whose
ramifications for law and socioeconomic change will be addressed in
the next section.
E. A Socio-Legal Methodology Beyond Weber:
Kant's Rechtslehre or Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie?
Habermas begins the foreword of Between Facts and Norms with
the curious statement that he will privilege Kant's philosophy of law
over Hegel's (whose name he shall "scarcely mention") so as to
"avoid a model that sets unattainable standards." '149 And indeed in
the very first chapter of the work he accords Kant's Rechtslehre
preeminence as the source of mediation of facticity and validity.5





150. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
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embodies a notion of law wherein the concrete facticity of law
enforcement presupposes the formal validity of a lawmaking process
into which, according to certain procedural requirements, normative
claims may be injected."' 1 It is not the content of this particular
account of the categories of facticity and validity that raises questions
regarding Habermas's theoretical-practical effort in general, but rather
his characterization of it as an exclusively Kantian problematic-a
characterization intrinsically tied to Habermas's jettisoning of Hegel
at the very outset of the book. I would argue that it is the unqualified
elevation of Kant and rather rude ejection of Hegel that facilitates
Habermas's failure to recognize the historical deficiencies of his own
efforts as described in the sections above-most importantly, the fact
that he is theorizing in a moment of crisis for the state.152
In fact, as Habermas proceeds to elaborate on the supposedly
Kantian quality of the categories of facticity and validity, it is actually
Weber's account of legality from Economy and Society that Habermas
paraphrases. 53 Had Habermas acknowledged Weber's historical
context at this juncture and had he not abandoned his own sensitivity
to the realities of historical change as derived from Hegel, he would
have been compelled to acknowledge further that the categories of
facticity and validity only became recognized as such in the midst of
the first crisis of German state and society in this century.
Instead, when Habermas explicitly turns to Weber's sociology of
law in Between Facts and Norms he presents Weber as merely part of
the neo-Kantian tradition (which includes Durkheim and Parsons)
that grappled with the quasi-perennial Kantian problem of facticity
and validity in general, not with the social demands of a particular
historical configuration."s Weber's own neo-Kantian legal sociology,
however, was in large degree addressed to the particular crisis men-
151. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 28. Rasmussen, "How is Valid Law Possible?"
22-23 and Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rechtsstaat," 204-05, carefully explicate the
manner in which Habermas theorizes the tension between facticity and validity within the very
structure of language itself.
152. Rosenfeld and Alexy are particularly good at highlighting the Kantian aspects of the
work, e.g., the use of "counter-factual" analysis, "reflective equilibrium," and "idealization."
Rosenfeld, "Law as Discourse," 1169, 1171, 1176, 1179; Alexy, "Basic Rights and Democracy,"
227, 232, 237. Based on this and my discussion below it is difficult to concur with David
Rasmussen's interpretation that Habermas signals a quasi-Hegelian strategy in Between Facts
and Norms, or with his suggestion that Habermas has actually "triumphed over" both Hegel and
Weber in his philosophy/sociology of law. Rasmussen, "How is Valid Law Possible?" 21. On the
contrary, Habermas has abandoned the former in a manner that figuratively enslaves him to the
latter. For engaging alternative readings of the role of Kant in the work, see Kenneth Baynes,
"Democracy and the Rechtsstaat," 207-09, and Ingeborg Maus, "Liberties and Popular
Sovereignty: On Jirgen Habermas' Reconstruction of the System of Rights," Cardozo Law
Review 17 (1996).
153. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 30-31.
154. Ibid., 66 ff.
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tioned above-a fact that Habermas oddly admits only in the very last
chapter of the book when he remarks that Weber had "bemoaned"
the transition from the formal rule of law to welfare-state defor-
malized law. This is, in fact, the same point in Between Facts and
Norms at which Habermas finally raises the issues of "transformation"
and "crisis": "This social transformation of law was initially thought
of as a process in which a new instrumental understanding of law, one
related to social-welfare conceptions of justice, was superimposed on
the liberal model of law. German jurisprudence has perceived this
long-standing process. . . as a 'crisis of law." ' 155 Given his intellectual
pedigree, Habermas might have raised these concerns from the outset
and made them central to his project. The relative facticity or validity
of law, therefore, simply did not become a critical issue for legal
theory in the late eighteenth-century context of Kant's writings. It
only became important under conditions of structural transformation
from laissez-faire to welfare-state capitalism-again, a central subject
of Habermas's Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
Habermas sidesteps the issue that "facticity and validity" emerged
as a problematic in a specific historical crisis of the state, thereby
blinding himself to the fact that he is taking up a similar problematic
in the midst of a contemporary crisis. Instead of treating facticity and
validity as Hegelian "moments" that change their orientation at
specific instances of historical change, Habermas treats them as
persistent and consistent themes of Kantian legal theory. Thus the
Kantianism of Habermas's approach in Between Facts and Norms is
still occupied with the quasi-Weberian attempt to make the
nineteenth-century character of Kant's philosophy conform with the
realities of welfare state conditions-but only on a theoretical level
and not in any significant way moving beyond Weber's particular
historical moment: "In connection with questions raised by modern
natural law, I attempt to show how the old promise of a self-or-
ganizing community of free and equal citizens can be reconceived
under the conditions of complex societies.""'6 For "old," read
"classical enlightenment," and for "complex societies," read "welfare
state." These are reifications that Habermas perpetuates throughout
the work, rarely pausing to consider whether the ever-increasing
differentiation characteristic of the expansion of the latter complexity
is instead a wholly new socioeconomic-political configuration.
It is fair to say, then, that Habermas presents the categories of
facticity and validity under the rubric of "perennial problems in
155. Ibid., 389, second emphasis added.
156. Ibid., 7, emphases added.
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Kantian legal-political theory." In this way, Habermas virtually
ensures that the ghosts of Weimar Germany will not be fully
exorcised from his theoretical endeavor, nor from the landscape of
contemporary law, politics, and society.'57 Those theorists and that
crisis discussed above emerged in the midst of a radical transfor-
mation of state, society, and economy from nineteenth- to twentieth-
century conditions. Rather than warding off the crisis that led to the
triumph of reaction and the unprecedented proliferation of social
destruction in the wake of Weimar's collapse, by occluding the
specificities of the new transformation Habermas may in fact
unintentionally make possible the emergence of modes of domination
different in kind than those that appeared in the 1930s (because they
are generated by different conditions) but nevertheless potentially
similar in extremity and intensity.
Habermas's theoretical project in Between Facts and Norms can be
understood ostensibly as an attempt to overcome-in the Hegelian
sense of an Aufhebung-the antinomy between the purely functional,
sociological focus on the facticity of state action and the purely
normative focus on the validity claims of political or legal philosophy.
And in response to the Weberian "historical" dilemma, Habermas
undertakes a Hegelian synthesis in his attempt to merge the
framework of nineteenth-century formal rule of law with that of the
twentieth-century "deformalized" or "materialized" law that emerges
with the welfare state, while simultaneously purging each "paradigm"
of its regressive characteristics. I have demonstrated, however, that
Habermas's success in carrying out an ostensibly Hegelian strategy
while relying extensively on a Kantian orientation is severely limited.
Throughout his recent work, including Between Facts and Norms,
Habermas distances his own theory from the holistic and deterministic
assumptions of what he labels "philosophies of history." In an explicit
reaction against the neo-Hegelianism of his formative work and to
some extent the tradition in which he developed, Habermas declares
explicitly in Between Facts and Norms that his approach "does not
need a philosophy of history to support it."' 58 Unfortunately, howev-
er, Habermas now interprets Hegelian methodology almost exclusively
in terms of the kind of crude totalism mentioned above-that is, on
the basis of its supposed inability to appreciate the diversity within
(and complexity of) modern societies.159 Habermas's extensive
157. On the relationship between the presence of these ghosts and Habermas's insufficiently
reconstructed appropriation of Kant, see Tracy B. Strong and Francis A. Sposito, "Habermas'
Significant Other," in White, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Habermas.
158. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 287.
159. See Jtirgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Calhoun, ed.,
Habermas and the Public Sphere, 430, 435-36, 442-45.
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reliance on the sociological assumptions of Luhmann's theory, in
which Luhmann tries to suffuse normativity, results in a negative
image of "totality" with apparent presuppositions about systems
differentiation that assume its supposedly indefinite continuation into
the future. In this way, Habermas renders inaccessible the aspect of
his earlier Hegelian-Marxian methodology that is ultimately indispen-
sable for his emancipatory goals: sensitivity to historical specificity and
qualitative social transformation.16° By avoiding the excesses in
which Hegelian philosophies of history have indulged in the past,
Habermas seems to have banished from his thought the possibility of
real, qualitative historical change, the locus where theoretical false
oppositions like facticity and validity can be grounded and understood
in practical reality.
1 61
It is precisely qualitative historical transformation that can either
provide the possibility for emancipatory social progress or else lead
toward reactionary social regression. But Habermas's theoretical
sensitivity to qualitative historical change is significantly blunted by
his extensive use of categories such as "rationalization" A la Weber or
"differentiation" A la Luhmann--categories that themselves presup-
pose a philosophy of history in their linear postulation of a future
constituted ultimately by more of the present. The average response
of any variety of Kantianisms to crisis or radical change has been to
assert the validity of transcendental spacio-temporal categories upon
a reality that increasingly resists such impositions. Just as
"pluralism"-the "fact" of a heterogeneity of incommensurable
perspectives within social life that may be contained by a formal
arrangement of procedures, legal or otherwise-was the socio-political
solution to "rationalization" in Weber's context, "complexity" is the
complement to notions of "differentiation" in our own. The
controversy over the relationship between Weber's neo-Kantian
methodology and the existentialist leanings of some of his political
orientations toward the end of his life raises the question of the
adequacy of such approaches for moments of crisis and change.
162
The political existentialist, whether starting, as did Weber, from a
neo-Kantian standpoint or from a self-understood opposition to it,
160. Two analyses that steadfastly hold Habermas to the Hegelian-Marxian standards that
he explicitly sets for himself and for critical theory in general, especially at the conclusion of
Thomas McCarthy, trans., Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press,
1984); Brenner, "The Limits of Civil Society"; and Love, "What is Left of Marx?"
161. For this kind of critique of Habermas's earlier works, Theory of Communicative Action
and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, respectively, see Moishe Postone, "History
and Critical Social Theory," Contemporary Sociology 19 (1990), and Moishe Postone, "History
and Political Theory" in Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere.
162. The classic examination of this question remains Mommsen, Max Weber and German
Politics. See also McCormick, "Transcending Weber's Categories."
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whether left- or right-leaning, senses the obsolescence of abstract
categories, encourages their evaporation, and promotes the new,
concretely grounded reality from which society can be restructured:
Witness today the "will to power" tendencies for which the feminism
of a MacKinnon or the legal philosophy of an Unger have been
criticized."6 The critical theorist, in contrast, seeks new categories
without regressively choosing between the concrete or abstract
antinomies offered by the moment; these new categories reflect a
privileging of neither subject nor object but an understanding of them
in the moment and character of change. Whether or not Habermas's
location of "overcoming" such oppositions in the practice of com-
munication is the ill-chosen misrecognition of history that replays
Lukics's fateful privileging of labor is a question that cannot be
definitively answered here and now.1" In a more mundane vein,
however, the nation-state level at which Habermas pitches his
discourse theory in Between Facts and Norms, or his elevation of this
explicitly nation-state-bound socio-legal theory to a supra-national
level, betrays a diminished sensitivity to the relationship of ideas and
reality, what he himself had earlier identified as theory and prac-
tice.165
Though it would surely be shortsighted to dismiss out of hand
Habermas's appropriation of Kantian-liberal institutional and
constitutional theory as a resource for his self-understood "socialist"
project,166 it is necessary to question the liberal social-theoretic
philosophy of history that pervades Between Facts and Norms as
manifested in Habermas's understanding of modernity as driven by
processes of sub-system differentiation and societal rationalization.167
163. On the dangerous inadequacy of conventional understandings of pluralism in Weber's
context and our own, see David Dyzenhaus, "Liberalism After the Fall: Schmitt, Rawls and the
Problem of Justification," Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (1996).
164. On the potential losses and gains of Habermas's recentering of critical theory in com-
munication rather than labor, see Love, "What's Left of Marx?"; Postone, "History and Critical
Social Theory"; and Giddens, "Reason Without Revolution?" Praxis International 2 (1982).
165. See Jtirgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press,
1973). On the necessity of mediating social scientific theory and practice and Habermas's
previous successes and failures in doing so, see John Dryzek, "Critical Theory as a Research
Program," in White, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Habermas.
166. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, xli. Immanuel Wallerstein approximates
something close to a leftist dismissal of liberalism's relevance for a social reality characterized
by globalization in his After Liberalism (New York: New Press, 1996).
167. The oft-ignored relationship between social-philosophical systems theory and political-
philosophical liberal theory is reflected in Stephen Holmes, "Differenzierung und Arbeitsteilung
im Denken des Liberalismus," in Soziale Differenzierung: Zur Geschichte einer Idee, ed. Niklas
Luhmann (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1985), and Charles Latmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). James Bohman sardonically takes note of
Habermas's "new found liberal modesty," and in the same tenor calls Between Facts and Norms
"a surprisingly liberal work." Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism and the Constitutional State,"
926, 928. What is problematically "liberal" about Between Facts and Norms is not, as many
critics have already suggested, Habermas's endorsement and adoption of liberal constitutional
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"Complexity" may be understood as the refuge in which Kantian
rationality hides, or against which it rebels, when faced with the
incommensurability of "ideal" categories and the "real world."
Habermas uses complexity within Between Facts and Norms, as do
commentators on the work, to invoke sociological reality when it in
fact functions as the de facto avoidance thereof."6 Habermas
absorbs much of Luhmann's systems theory in his attempt both to
buttress it normatively and to address a Weberian scenario no longer
of first-order concern for a contemporary sociology of law. A reliance
on Luhmann and complexity in the present and a fixation on Weber
and rationalization in the past render the promise of Habermas's
project potentially stillborn. In this sense he is only slightly more suc-
cessful than Weber, whose analysis of the historical transformation of
law at the beginning of this century offered no solution to the
situation. And while Habermas has recently attempted to confront the
challenges posed to constitutional democracy by globalization, his
solutions are not fully considered.
Habermas presently advocates the fostering of a transnational
European civil society through the proliferation of communicative
technologies within Europe. Such communicative action will create an
increasingly more powerful European Parliament that can be made
responsive to citizens of Europe.1 69 Besides making premature
institutional presumptions with respect to the development of the
European Parliament, however, Habermas is insufficiently attentive
to the literature on telecommunications in Europe, a literature which
does not necessarily support his expectations about a communicatively
and institutional theory, but rather his seeming acceptance of liberal sociological and epis-
temological presuppositions. One may not want to argue with the imperfect successes of liberal
principles and practices at fostering the kind of "autonomy" that leftists and liberals both desire;
certainly, Habermas's and his students' healthy borrowings from these lessons have proved
valuable and will continue to do so. However, to accept wholesale the liberal account of
modernity (in either its optimistic Whiggish or pessimistic Weberian versions), the individualist
epistemology of subjectivity and the positivistic objective analysis of society will do more to
occlude the opportunity for realizing autonomy in contemporary contexts than facilitate its
attainment. On Habermas's position between liberalism and Marxism, see Mark Warren,
"Liberal Constitutionalism as Ideology: Marx and Habermas," Political Theory 17 (1989).
168. Two sophisticated versions of a "complexity" approach to democracy are
Bernhard Peters, Die Integration moderner Gesellschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993)
and Danilo Zolo, Democracy and Complexity (Cambridge: Polity, 1992). Any account of
"complexity" or "differentiation" must contend with Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the
Welfare State (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1990). On the problems with Habermas's dependence
on systems theory and its notion of complexity, see Thomas McCarthy, "Complexity and
Democracy: or the Seducements of Systems Theory" and Hans Joas, "The Unhappy Marriage
of Hermeneutics and Functionalism" in Communicative Action, ed. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
169. See Habermas, "The European Nation State," as well as Habermas, "Comments On
Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?'," European Law Journal 1 (1995).
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democratic European civil society.17 It is also simply uncertain
whether a new "European" civil society or public sphere will function
with respect to European institutions in the manner that organizations
of national citizens did with respect to the nation state over the last
two centuries. 7' The status of social democracy in the European
Union at this moment is at best unclear and at worst precarious.'72
Habermas's model explicitly requires a robust quality of social welfare
to sustain the kind of coercion-free and vigorously discursive lifeworld
institutions that characterize its proper functioning. For these reasons,
Habermas's recent suggestion that his discourse theory of law and
democracy be transposed to the level of the European Union to
better address changing historical circumstances is inadequate at this
point in time.
Habermas declares that the facticity/validity dichotomy cannot be
mediated at the level of theory alone, i.e., at the level of validity. Yet
this is what he does in operating with unreflected assumptions about
factual reality. He builds the potential for an unavoidable
anachronism into his project. Focusing on formalist versus substantive
strategies, or the proper way of overcoming these, obfuscates equally
important debates in the study of law, the state, and the international
arena. Habermas is, however, correct in his identification of both
private and constitutional law as the sites at which to perceive and
address concrete problems facing postindustrial democracies.
170. See Steven D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43 (1990-91); Hamid Mowlana, Global Communication in
Transition: The End of Diversity? (Thousand Oaks: Seige Publications, 1992); and Wayne
Sandholtz, "Institutional and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western
Europe," World Politics 45 (1993). The literature that Habermas cites in Between Facts and
Norms on the subject of the media is generally more nationally focused and potentially less
appropriate to discussions about a European public sphere. See Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms, 444-45, 454-58. Moreover his expressed desire to avoid treating this subject with the kind
of pessimism that characterized his early work and the late writings of his mentor, Theodor W.
Adorno, is not an appropriate social scientific orientation; "optimism" and "pessimism" are not
social-theoretical categories. See also Jtlrgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public
Sphere," in Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere.
171. See Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership
in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994).
172. See Giandomenico Majone, "The European Community Between Social Policy and
Social Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (1993); Stephan Leibfried and Paul
Pierson, "Europe's Semi-Sovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in an Emerging Multi-Tiered
System," in European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration, ed. Stephan
Leibfried and Paul Pierson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1993); Wolfgang Streeck,
"European Social Policy after Maastricht: The 'Social Dialogue' and 'Subsidiarity'," Economic
and Industrial Democracy 15 (1994); Stephan Leibfried, "The Social Dimension of the European
Union: En Route to Positively Joint Sovereignty?", Journal of European Social Policy 4 (1994).
To this end, Seyla Benhabib's observation that Habermas's contemporary formulation of critical
theory runs the risk of forsaking the "transfigurative" potential of the project in the name of the
"joyless reformism" of welfare state democratic theory is especially incisive if the sociological
conditions for the latter have substantially evaporated. Seyla Benhabib, "The Utopian
Dimension in Communicative Ethics," New German Critique 85 (1985).
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Fortunately, there are scholars who are grappling with those concrete
legal changes in a more perspicacious manner, and who may therefore
be better situated to make pronouncements on the future of
democracy in a transnational context. 173 While Habermas presumes
territorially bound statutory and constitutional parameters for his
theory, contemporary legal sociology-especially that which makes the
European Union its focus-is debating the level as much as the kind
of law that can both preserve democratic traditions and forge new
ones.
1 74
Discerning, for instance, whether European Union law is more like
national statutes or international treaties is a more currently relevant
question than whether formal or deformalized law is best suited to a
national welfare state. Certainly the issue of formalist versus
deformalized modes of law will obtain at the European Union level,
but such debates can not simply be hoisted up to that tier without
incorporating into socio-legal considerations the potential qualitative
change in the categories that thereby results.175 The welfare state is
indeed in trouble, but its crisis will not be addressed in a decision
whether nineteenth- or twentieth-century strategies (or a combination
thereof) are appropriate to ensure vigorous discursive democracy
within the lifeworlds of particular nation states. Since the genesis of
the present crisis of the welfare state and hence of social democracy
itself is to a large degree transnational in cause, solutions must be
sought in strategies beyond the state and not transposed mechanically
from the state to the transnational level.
Habermas's reconfiguration of Weber's state-society model into his
own system-lifeworld model allows him to formulate a theory wherein
173. On the study of law in Habermas's chosen site of application, Europe, see Christian
Joerges, "Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process
of European Integration," European Law Journal 2 (1996); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "New
Directions in Legal Research on the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies
31 (1993); and Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal 100
(1991).
174. Wayne Sandholtz, "Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to
European Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1996); Francis Snyder, "The
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques,"
Modern Law Review 56 (1993); MacCormick, "Beyond the Sovereign State"; and Nicolas Green,
The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992).
175. This critique applies to Bill Scheuerman's provocative endorsement of a revival of the
formal rule of law to address the crisis of welfare state law. See Scheuerman, Between the Norm
and the Exception. What is needed is not a return to the exact analysis and prescriptions of
Neumann's "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society," but a new analysis that
embeds the status of law within developments related to transnational phenomena and not
exclusively those of an emerging welfare state. The level at which such an analysis is pitched and
the quality of its substance needs reevaluation. For a more elaborate critique along these lines,
see John P. McCormick, review of Between the Norm and the Exception, by William E.
Scheuerman, History of Political Thought (forthcoming 1997).
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law serves as the key that unlocks Weber's normatively vapid and
coercive "iron-cage." However, since Habermas's superior account of
the welfare states that were emerging in Weber's time may no longer
rely upon the assumption that such states are relatively self-sufficient
politically, economically, and socially, the sociology and philosophy of
law needs to be further reconstructed to address the "alloy sieve" that
contemporary states seem to be becoming in the modern international
arena.
Toward the end of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas insists
explicitly on the historical focus of his enterprise:
Because [democratic-constitutional] rights must be interpreted in
various ways under changing social circumstances, the light they
throw on this context is refracted into a spectrum of changing
legal paradigms. Historical constitutions can be seen as so many
ways of construing one and the same practice-the practice of
self-determination on the part of free and equal legal subjects;
but like every practice this too is situated in history. Those
involved must start with their own current practice if they want
to achieve clarity about what such a practice means in
general.
17 6
This is an explicit injunction to contextualize one's own moment and
one's proposed activity within it as a basic step in the process of
democratic practice. However, Habermas's own mode of analysis, an
analysis that has abandoned Hegel in favor of Kant, ultimately
forecloses the very emancipatory possibility that it aspires to open.
The dilemma of historicizing emancipatory practice necessarily evokes
the figure of Lukics who, though ultimately succumbing to his own
"philosophy of history," helped lay the social-theoretical foundations
for the project of critical theory in which Habermas is engaged.
Habermas had intended that his Kantian turn in the years leading up
to the publication of Theory of Communicative Action would serve as
the second, more efficacious, appropriation of Weber in the tradition
of critical theory. In the present context, however, one of the most
enduringly relevant aspects of Lukdcs's first appropriation of Weber
in History and Class Consciousness is his indictment of neo-Kantian,
Weberian methodologies for their inability to grasp qualitative
historical transfigurations. 7 In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas
demonstrates that it is rather his own "critical theory" that has been
appropriated by Weberian methodology and not vice-versa, for his
176. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 386-87.
177. Lukdcs, History and Class Consciousness, 144-45.
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theoretical project succumbs to that socio-historical myopia still
characteristic of similar theoretical frameworks.
CONCLUSION
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas impressively resolves the
dilemmas, both normative and historical, bequeathed to him by
Weber's Sociology of Law. The discourse theory of law effectively
replenishes the void left in Weber's analytical approach and
straightforwardly addresses the dilemma left by his historical
approach. But because this resolution is carried out with the as-
sumption of a historical, sociological, economic, and political reality
having grown merely more "complex" since Weber's day, Habermas's
legal solution is lacking in contemporary efficacy. His own mechanical
attempt to update his theory in application, with only minor ad-
justment, to a supranational level of the European Union has thus far
lacked the historical sensibility of the author of The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere and the heir, however critical, of
the author of History and Class Consciousness. These works
delineated the relationship between the changing intellectual currents
and transforming socioeconomic conditions at two different points in
the emergence of industrial welfare states in the Northern
Hemisphere. Habermas's present project requires just such a radical
interrogation of the welfare state, a state undergoing changes brought
on by transnational developments, a state in which he must situate,
and thus necessarily recenter, his discourse theory of law.
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